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ABSTRACT 
Participatory Development in Social Funds: A Case Study of the Peruvian Social Fund 
C. V. Costella 
Masters of Administration Mini-thesis, School of Government, Faculty of Economic and 
Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape 
 
Social Funds are a type of intervention whereby development agencies 
transfer control over project resources and decision-making to community groups and 
other local actors who formulate and implement those projects based on their own 
assessment of priorities. Social Funds were among the first programs to incorporate 
notions of participation of the poor and civil society in projects financed by the 
multilateral finance institutions.  
Several approaches argue that community participation in development 
projects leads to interventions that meet the priorities of the beneficiaries more 
accurately (which results in more sustainable project outcomes) and empowers 
participants. However, those who criticise participation claim that participatory 
processes might be constrained by the implementing agency as well as by power and 
economic differences within the community itself. The development agency has its 
own priorities, organizational goals, structure, and a complex external environment, 
all of which may limit its ability to implement participatory processes. This could 
lead to the use of the participation ‘label’ without substantive inclusion of the 
beneficiaries and, ultimately, hinder the potential advantages of this approach.  
This research aims to assess the role of Social Funds’ organizational and 
institutional characteristics for community participation processes in development 
projects. The research is based on a case study of the Peruvian Social Fund, 
FONCODES, and utilizes a qualitative data collection approach. It mainly relies on 
semi-structured interviews with FONCODES’ staff and community members, un-
structured interviews with experts, and analysis of operational documents.  
The research concludes that several organizational and institutional 
characteristics affect community participation in FONCODES projects but the 
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direction of this influence depends on how specific areas of the organization’s 
context are structured as well as on political variables in the institutional 
environment.   
The evidence shows that, in general, FONCODES’ organizational 
systems and procedures are geared towards formal inclusion of communities in 
its interventions. The project cycle offers many instances for these groups to 
participate, such as representative committees, community meetings, and 
community contributions. However, FONCODES staff’s influence on project 
participation might be negative when they are not qualified, trained or motivated 
to facilitate participatory processes. The research also finds that local 
governments may have a negative effect on priority setting and participatory 
processes that may arise from political considerations. Finally, although 
FONCODES does well at designing formal instances of participation at the 
promotion and project implementation stages, project design seems to have little 
input from communities. This seems to be a general characteristic of Social 
Funds and could ultimately affect project sustainability.  
Although Social Funds programs tend to be very diverse in nature and 
structure, the findings from this research can serve as guidelines for other 
programs, as well as a general exploration of the complex reality of Social Fund 
design and implementation.  
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CHAPTER 1. SOCIAL FUNDS AND PARTICIPATION:  
OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Social Investment Funds (or Social Funds) are a type of multi-sectoral, demand-driven 
development intervention, generally financed by the World Bank and other multilateral 
finance institutions (MFIs). These programs appeared for the first time in the development 
landscape in the late 1980s and were conceived, in many cases, as emergency operations to 
provide temporary relief to the sectors affected by economic crises, conflict or natural 
disasters. Social Funds are based in a decentralized, demand-based approach, which means 
that community groups and other local actors formulate and implement interventions to 
address their development priorities, based on the assessment of their own needs. Social Funds 
programs have generally been executed by autonomous government agencies and aimed at 
providing basic social and economic infrastructure as well as other, longer-term, income-
generating investments. They were among the first programs financed by the MFIs to 
incorporate notions of participatory and demand-driven development into their operations. 
The concept of participation in development has been part of the discipline for many 
decades, although for most of the time it remained a concept used by ‘alternative 
development’ approaches. In general, many of these approaches argue that ‘community 
participation’ in development projects leads to interventions that meet the priorities of the 
beneficiaries more accurately, which in turn might result in better and more sustainable project 
outcomes. Others argue that participation is good in itself since it contributes to the 
‘empowerment’ of individuals to be in control of their own development. By the early 1990s, 
the notions of participatory development started to make their way into projects financed by 
the ‘big development’1 institutions. Community-Driven Development (CDD) was one of the 
models on which the World Bank first, and other regional Banks later, relied to implement 
participatory projects. CDD refers to projects that involve communities in development 
                                                 
1
 This term refers to the MFIs and bilateral development agencies that are characterized by large scale interventions. It 
is used here to differentiate the MFIs from NGOs, non-profits and other national and international civil society 
organizations which are characterized by smaller programs and, in many cases, by development approaches that focus 
less on macroeconomic dimensions of development and more on other small scale, social, community-based aspects 
of these interventions.  
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interventions and give them direct control over key project decisions as well as over the 
management of project funds.  
By the turn of the century, however, participatory approaches started being challenged 
on several grounds. Some argued that participation might be constrained by the external 
agencies implementing the projects (since the external agency has its own priorities and 
‘owns’ the participatory tools and the project); but, also, by power and economic 
differences within the community itself. External agencies and facilitators would be in a 
position to influence participatory processes at the community level, which in turn would 
result in projects where the real priorities and needs of the beneficiaries are not met. In 
addition, the agency itself would be constrained by its organizational goals and structure 
as well as by the need to maintain ‘good’ relations with other actors within its 
institutional environment. Then, the limitations that the agency and the facilitators face, 
would lead to using the ‘participation label’ without a ‘real’ (substantive) inclusion of 
the beneficiaries, thus hindering the potential benefits of the participatory process. 
Along this line, the present research aims to assess the role of the organizational and 
institutional characteristics of development agencies in community participation processes in 
Social Fund projects. For this, the research looks at organizational systems and procedures, 
staff issues and the organization’s institutional environment. It also explores issues of 
participation within the community, with a focus on formal and substantial participation in 
Social Funds sub-projects.  
The current debate around participation is considered relevant for the Social Fund 
approach since these programs are based on the assumption that community involvement 
would contribute not only to project success but also to building capacity and empowerment 
for local populations. Moreover, the research is relevant for the development management 
field as it aims to provide evidence of the influence of external agencies on development 
interventions.  
The research uses a case study approach, focusing on FONCODES, the Peruvian 
Social Fund. FONCODES is one of the largest Social Funds in Latin America, and its 
community participation scheme has been used as a model in the region. Data collection was 
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carried out at FONCODES’ Central Office in Lima and at the Abancay Regional Office, 
located in the Apurimac region, over a period of seven weeks. 
The research utilizes a qualitative data collection approach that seeks to obtain the 
perceptions of different actors. This approach was considered appropriate due to the nature of 
the variables and indicators in the research, especially because it would help obtain a greater 
level of depth and detail from the information. Primary data was collected from semi-
structured interviews with FONCODES’ staff and community members as well as from un-
structured interviews with experts knowledgeable both on the organization’s functioning as 
well as on the Peruvian context. Additionally, FONCODES operational documents were 
analyzed and observation was conducted at the Social Fund’s offices in Lima and Abancay as 
well as at community meetings in the Apurimac province. Finally, secondary data from 
evaluations of FONCODES and other program documents provide support to the research 
while furnishing quantitative data.  
This minithesis is organized into five Chapters and the Conclusions. Chapter 1 
provides an overview of Social Funds and their role as development instruments, their 
advantages and critiques as well as a general introduction to the way these programs work. 
The chapter also analyzes various participatory approaches across the history of the 
development discipline and reviews some of the literature available. Chapter 2 deals with three 
different but related topics. First, the chapter provides a conceptual approach to participation, 
its aims, types and theoretical debates. The chapter then introduces the Community-Driven 
Development and Social Fund models and their assumptions. Lastly, the critiques to 
participation are articulated around the current debate and some general principles for Social 
Fund design are introduced. Chapter 3 formulates the research objectives and poses research 
questions. It also describes the operationalisation of the variables as well as the research 
methodology, including data analysis and research limitations. Chapter 4 provides background 
information on Peru and FONCODES and serves as an introduction to Chapter 5, which 
systematically describes the research findings. The last chapter provides a general overview of 
the findings, pointing out conclusions and recommendations for Social Funds officers and 
researchers.  
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1.2. SOCIAL FUNDS: AN OVERVIEW 
Since their inception at the end of the 1980s, Social Funds have become a 
popular type of intervention in World Bank and other MFI’s projects as well as the 
instrument of choice by several governments to implement small, community-based 
social and economic infrastructure projects. This chapter aims at providing an overview 
of Social Funds programs, its main characteristics and key defining concepts. It provides 
a brief analysis of the community-driven, participatory nature of these programs and 
moves on to analyze the history of and literature on participation in the development 
field in general and in relation to social funds in particular.  
 
1.2.1. The evolution of Social Funds 
The first Social Fund was established in Bolivia in 1987. The Bolivian Emergency 
Social Fund was financed by the World Bank and was intended as an emergency operation to 
provide temporary employment and social services in a time of crisis. From then onwards, 
Social Funds were rapidly established in many countries, becoming not only one of the 
preferred programs to swiftly respond to emergencies but also a key instrument in 
operationalising the concepts of community participation and social capital in World Bank 
projects. By financing emergency, small-scale, demand-driven social and economic 
infrastructure projects, Social Funds pioneered ‘community-driven’ projects at the World 
Bank2. However, it is important to note that Social Funds were first developed in practice, 
while the theoretical body around them was generated as more and more information was 
obtained from their experience on the field. Van Domelen notes that the expansion of Social 
Funds “was done from the bottom up; there were no formal World Bank policy papers on 
social funds, no directives [...] no lending targets, no overall strategy” (Van Domelen, 2006: 
180).  
From 1987 to the turn of the century, the World Bank committed US$3.5 billion for 
98 projects in 57 countries (Van Domelen, 2006: 180). However, most Social Funds were co-
financed by other regional Banks, development agencies and national governments. This 
                                                 
2
 Some have claimed that Social Funds also served to respond, in part, to the criticisms that ‘big development’ institutions 
faced as a consequence of their top-down approach to development interventions and a focus on macroeconomic reforms as the 
‘only solution’ to the problems of developing countries. 
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additional financing brought that total to about US$ 8 billion (Van Domelen, 2006: 180). In 
Latin America alone, by 1999, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) had financed 
Social Funds for US$1.3 billion (Tendler, 2000(a): 87). Between 2000 and 2007, the World 
Bank financed almost 50 Social Fund projects across the world, totalling almost US$ 2 billion 
(De Silva and Sum, 2008:11).  
Social Funds have been widely praised as programs that have the capacity to quickly 
respond to crises and to the needs of the poor. However, they have also faced criticism 
regarding their institutional mechanisms and the role they have played in national poverty 
alleviation strategies. Van Domelen (2006: 181) notes that Social Funds have enabled quick 
response to crises, as has been the case in contexts of economic adjustment, transition 
economies as well as in conflict and natural disasters situations. She also notes that these 
programs  “increase access of the poor to basic social services and productive assets” while in 
many cases “seek to improve the underlying institutional capacity of poor communities” (Van 
Domelen, 2006: 181). Furthermore, the Social Funds Website (World Bank Social Funds 
Website, 2009) states that  
Social Funds tend to improve allocative efficiency by delivering public goods 
and services in a way that fits local preferences better than centrally 
implemented programs. Social Funds allow communities to handle their 
subproject's procurement and financing, which tends to improve supervision 
and accountability, while at the same time increasing local capacity building 
and production efficiency. 
 
 However, Social Funds critics have argued that these mechanisms are far from being 
the solution their proponents claim. Various authors have argued that Social Funds “distort the 
public sector” as they become “enclaves of excellence that do little to reform existing 
government institutions” (Tendler, 2000 in Van Domelen, 2006: 182). Social Funds’ 
management practices, procurement procedures and salaries levels are generally comparable 
to those seen in the private sector, which, in most cases, makes them more efficient than other 
public sector agencies. Thus, they can become a diversion of resources and attention from the 
more substantial need to reform the public sector and to build capacity in long lasting 
institutions.  
In more recent years, the role of Social Funds in local development has been also 
thoroughly examined. Social Funds have been accused of bypassing local governments and 
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hence endangering incipient decentralization processes while missing an opportunity for 
developing the capacity of local authorities (Bhatia, 2005: 46). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that Social Funds’ work with communities is not “true community development” since 
the direct transfer of funds to communities creates opportunities for elite capture of benefits 
(Van Domelen, 2006: 183).  
Currently, the emergency character of Social Funds has subsided and program design 
has moved toward achieving project sustainability as well as to financing other income 
generation activities that go beyond the initial focus on infrastructure. Social Funds are now 
one of many instruments to implement development operations and, in that role, their range of 
activities has expanded. In many cases, Social Funds have been tasked with leading the 
decentralization process in the country, as well as with the objective of enhancing capacity in 
local communities.  The next section will look at the design of Social Funds and will introduce 
the participatory notions that support this model.  
 
1.2.2. Social Funds Design and Implementation 
Social Funds have been defined as “agencies that finance small projects in several 
sectors targeted to benefit a country’s poor and vulnerable groups based on a participatory 
manner of demand generated by local groups and screened against a set of eligibility criteria” 
(World Bank Social Funds Website, 2009). Social Fund programs are generally executed 
by an ad hoc autonomous government agency directly linked to the Executive. In most cases, 
the autonomy of the agency is reinforced by a defined and protected budget, exemptions from 
civil service salary regulations and from the government’s usual procurement and 
disbursements rules (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997:2).  
Social Funds finance a great variety of investments and activities, ranging from 
infrastructure improvements, job creation and social services provision, to capacity building, 
community empowerment and community linkages with local government (World Bank 
Social Funds Website, 2007). They carry out their operations through ‘community-driven’ 
projects, a model that allows the ‘poor and vulnerable’ to define their priorities and to propose 
the interventions that meet their most urgent needs. For this, local communities are generally 
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organized in ‘committees’ or community-based organizations (CBO) that articulate their 
demands based on a participatory assessment of their needs.  
The main goal of Social Funds is to benefit a country’s poor and vulnerable. Within 
this general goal some particular objectives3 have been identified by Batkin (2001: 430) as: a) 
short-term employment creation, b) building and upgrading social and economic 
infrastructure, c) developing civil society and social capital, d) promoting private sector 
contracting, e) developing non-infrastructure income generation, and f) supporting national 
programs of decentralization.  
 
Social Fund     Communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Social Fund Project Cycle 
Source: Adapted from Narayan and Ebbe, 1997: 13. 
 
                                                 
3
 Social Funds’ characteristics greatly vary among different programs and countries and, in a majority of cases, a Social Fund 
will have some but not all of these objectives. 
Targeting 
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The Social Fund sub-project4 cycle is based in the constant interaction between 
communities and the social fund agency (Fig. 1.1). In general, the Social Fund agency 
identifies communities, promotes the formation of implementing committees, and fosters 
participatory identification of community needs. These needs are translated into a sub-project, 
which is identified, appraised, and eventually approved by the Social Fund agency. The 
community implements the sub-project with the technical support from experts and the 
agency. After sub-projects are completed, the community groups are consulted and in some 
cases beneficiary assessments are conducted to evaluate the projects. The cycle starts again 
with targeting and promotion within new communities.   
From a theoretical perspective, Social Funds are based on the Community-
Driven Development (CDD) approach that developed at the World Bank. Although 
sometimes the terms Social Funds and CDD are used to indicate a similar kind of 
programs, they are different in that the former refers to an instrument used to implement 
development interventions, while the latter refers to a theoretical approach to 
development (De Silva & Sum, 2008: 1-2). Thus, Social Funds programs tend to use the 
CDD approach for their design and operation. CDD is a term coined at the World Bank 
to refer to projects where control over resources and decision-making is transferred to 
communities  (De Silva & Sum, 2008: 2). CDD entails, by its very nature, community 
participation. In the next section, the development of the concept of participation in 
development will be studied, from the early school of Emancipatory Participation in the 
late 1960s to the development of participatory approaches at the World Bank and other 
Multilateral Finance Institutions (MFIs) in the 90s, to the critiques this type of 
interventions currently face.  
 
1.3. PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT: LITERATURE REVIEW  
The ideas that support the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach, on 
which Social Funds are based, have their roots in the long-standing, albeit sometimes vague, 
idea that the recipients of development aid should be involved in the process of their own 
                                                 
4
 ‘Sub-project’ refers to the development intervention implemented at the community level and by the community 
group. In this study, this term is used interchangeably with the term ‘project’ when referring to the intervention at the 
local level. 
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development (Crocker, 2008: 339). The idea of participation in development has been present 
since the beginning of the discipline. Several schools of thoughts, with different views of 
participation, have developed throughout the years; some of them prevail today as 
complementary and sometimes mutually critic approaches to the essential concern of popular 
agency in development.  
Although, for the most part, participation was considered a core precept of different 
currents within the ‘alternative development movement’ that developed between the 1960s 
and the end of the century5, participation is now commonplace in the development discourse. 
The basic idea that “persons or groups should make their own decisions, at least about the 
most fundamental matters, rather than having others […] make decisions for them” (Crocker, 
2008: 339) is widely accepted by most actors in development. The following sections will 
present a brief history of this concept as well as its current challenges.  
 
1.3.1. The ‘60s and ‘70s: Emancipatory Participation or Collective Action 
One of the first theories of participation in development, the ‘Emancipatory 
Participation’ approach originated in Latin America in the late 1960s, mostly as a reaction to 
authoritarian governments in that region. Freire’s6 theory was based on the postulate that 
“every human being, no matter how ‘ignorant’ or submerged in the ‘culture of silence’, is 
capable of looking critically at his world, and that provided with the proper tools, he can 
gradually perceive his personal and social reality and deal critically with it” (Long, 2001: 7).  
This approach sees participation as a right of citizenship that each person, regardless of his/her 
position in society, is entitled to. Education, self-awareness and ‘participation as citizenship’ 
would allow the individual to challenge subordination and marginalization and to transform 
his/her social reality. The approach pioneered methods now commonly known as participatory 
                                                 
5Alternative development was coined in the 1970s and has invariably been used to refer to approaches proposed 
outside the ‘orthodoxy’ of the World Bank and other main donors’ development agencies. According to Pieterse 
(1998: 345), Alternative Development can be seen as a roving critique of mainstream development, as an 
interconnected series of alternative proposals and methodologies, or as an alternative development paradigm. 
However difficult a definition is, it is clear that alternative development has been concerned with alternative practices 
of development –participatory and people centered- and with redefining the goals of development (Pieterse, 1998: 
345). On the other hand, ‘Mainstream Development’ refers here to the model that has prevailed in the ‘big 
development’ institutions, i.e. the World Bank, other MFIs and bilateral cooperation agencies.  
6
 Paulo Freire and his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed are the best well-known exponents of this school of thought. One of the 
editions of this book is available as: Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum, 2007. In this 
paper, the author has referred to this source based on Long, C., 2001 and Hickey, S. and G. Mohan (Eds). 2004. 
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action research (PAR) while proposing critical consciousness, popular education, and support 
for popular organizations as ways of helping marginalized individuals to take action in society.  
 The initial enthusiasm with this type of notions was, by the early 1970s, replaced by 
the relative pessimism of the ‘Collective Action’ theories. These theories claimed that “in the 
absence of coercion, or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interest” (Olson, 1973 in Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 5). Furthermore, those with a smaller 
stake in the provision of a public good would ultimately free ride on the efforts of those with a 
larger interest on it (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 5). Garret Hardin and others complemented this 
theory with the proposition that “common property resources would be over exploited as 
demand rose unless the commons were enclosed or strong state regulation was put in place to 
protect them” (Hardin, 1968; Demsetz, 1970; North, 1990 in Mansuri and Rao, 2003, p. 
5-6). These notions were reflected on the policies and strategies supported by the main MFIs 
and bilateral cooperation agencies, arguing for strongly state-controlled interventions and a 
focus in property rights.  
Collective Action theories and, especially, the management of Common Pool 
Resources were disputed in the 1990s by the work of Ostrom. Her main argument was that 
these theories were based in a set of theoretical assumptions that could be challenged at the 
empirical level. “In the ‘real world’ after all, one can change the capabilities of those involved 
and thus change the constraints themselves” (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 7). Through empirical 
evidence, it was possible to demonstrate several experiences of common pool resources being 
successfully managed by ‘endogenous institutions’.  
 
1.3.2. The ’80s: People-centred Approaches and Participation in Development 
People-centred development approaches have their roots in the mid-80s 
disappointment with the results of ‘big development’ programs. People-centred 
development approaches emerged as an alternative to top-down interventions, being 
implemented by the state and fostered by the main development agencies.  Rather than a 
single, encompassing theory, people-centred development is a collection of approaches, 
models and methodologies that share some core principles.  These approaches have a 
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focus on human well being as a guiding principle for development intervention. The 
models focus in ‘development from below’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches to development 
interventions. They recognize ‘ordinary’ people’s participation and their capacity to 
modify their social environment. Nayyar and Chang have articulated one of the premises 
of people-centred development in the following way: the “well-being of humankind is 
the essence of development [which] is often forgotten in the dominant discourse, where 
aggregate growth figures or the pro-corporate concept of ‘economic freedom’ get more 
attention than the well-being of people” (Nayyar and Chang, 2005: 3.). Within these 
approaches, and perhaps the development field in general, the single most influential 
model on participation has been the ‘participation in development’ approach whose 
ideas have been articulated by Robert Chambers and others.  
The ‘participation in development’ approach proposes small-scale interventions 
in which local people are the main actors. Through participatory processes, insiders (i.e. 
local people who benefit from the intervention) formulate their own development 
priorities, while outsiders (i.e. development practitioners) utilize the local knowledge to 
facilitate the projects. This approach has often been regarded as a collection of methods 
to carry out participatory processes at the local level, which are summarized in the 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA/PLA) model.  
Chambers defines PRA/PLA as “a growing family of approaches, methods, 
attitudes and behaviours to enable and empower people to share, analyze and enhance 
their knowledge of life and conditions, and to plan, act, monitor, evaluate and reflect” 
(Chambers, 2002: 2). The approach is strongly linked to development practice while, by 
definition, lacks a rigid theoretical support. Chambers proposes that “each of us should 
give our own answers to what PRA or PLA is or should be […] ‘Use your best judgment 
at all times’ is one part of the core [of PRA/PLA]” (Chambers, 2002: 2).  
There are several tools used to facilitate participation processes at the local level, 
which involve visual and verbal methods such as diagramming, participatory mapping 
and shared presentations and analysis. These methods are meant to contribute towards 
empowerment since they allow people to express and share their knowledge with others 
and to learn through this process. The process of planning and implementing solutions to 
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their own development allows people to “further learn through the experience of action” 
(Chambers, 1994: 1444). 
PRA/PLA rapidly spread geographically, methodologically, and institutionally. 
From an early focus in appraisal and planning in rural interventions, mainly used by 
NGOs in a few developing countries, it has become a tool for planning, action and 
monitoring and evaluation in a wide range of (urban and rural) settings, used by NGOs, 
government and major donors in most developing countries (Chambers, 2002: 5). 
Together with the rapid spread of PRA/PLA, several challenges, dangers and critiques 
have come along, which will be presented later in this chapter.  
 
1.3.3. Participation and “Big Development” Institutions 
As noted, the concept of participation was, until the late 1980s, part of alternative 
development approaches. These approaches were mostly used by ‘third-sector 
institutions’ (NGOs, community-based organizations) but rarely adopted by multilateral 
finance institutions and bilateral cooperation agencies (Long, 2001: 8). Long (2001: 5) 
notes that  
[…] in the early days of development, donor agencies, both bilateral 
and multilateral, were organized and shaped by the understanding that 
their mission was to deliver [sic] development to poor countries. 
People hired by these institutions were trained in economics, 
engineering or other, mostly technical, disciplines. They were expected 
to improve economic performance of developing countries, build roads, 
schools and hospitals […] Development, however, has proven to be a 
more complex enterprise than anyone visualized [then]” 
 
By the early 1990s, however, these agencies became more open to participation 
in development projects. Several changes in the political context in the late 1980s as 
well as more documentation on the value of participation to project effectiveness (Long, 
2001: 9) led these agencies to conclude that beneficiary participation in development 
projects was desirable since it would enhance their effectiveness and sustainability 
(McGee, R., 2002: 95).  
At the World Bank, the impetuses for incorporating participation were given 
mainly by outside institutions, i.e. NGOs and ‘social development’ scholars, but also by 
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some actors inside the Bank. The first exploration of participation issues from within the 
Bank came with the book “Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural 
Development” by Michael Cernea (1985 in Bebbington et al., 2006: 14), the first 
sociologist to be hired by the World Bank, in 1974. Cernea led the then recently formed 
Sociology Group at the Bank, a loose community of practice integrated by the scattered 
social scientists working for the institution in the 1980s. This group focused on ways to 
promote participation in rural development projects but also on incorporating a 
sociological dimension to the way development was understood by the Bank; “to 
challenge the ‘economic reductionism’ in the institution’s theory of development” 
(Bebbington et al., 2006: 14).  
According to Bebbington et al. (2006: 15) ‘outsiders’ (non-Bank staff and 
researchers, NGOs, etc.) were instrumental to the work of the Sociology Group and, 
ultimately, the “cross-boundary relationships” between them and Bank staff “played an 
important role in opening up spaces in the institution that, in turn, [gave] more room to 
those within the Bank who [were] committed to social development”. The authors note 
that this kind of interaction ultimately led to the institutionalization of the concerns for 
participation within the Bank.  
Pressures from non-Bank actors, especially NGOs, for the Bank to incorporate 
participation of the poor and civil society in its projects, led to the creation, in 1990, of a 
cross-organizational Participation Learning Group commanded by the NGO unit. This 
group had the mandate to “examine the issue of participation and identify challenges to 
the Bank in stepping up its efforts to support participation in its operations” (World 
Bank, 1994 in Long, 2001: 27). The research and analysis carried by this group is 
considered to have laid the groundwork for incorporating participatory practices into the 
Bank’s operations (Long, 2001: 32).  This work culminated at a conference on 
participation in 1994, which would ultimately led to the publication, in February 1996, 
of the Participation Sourcebook. This book was designed as a resource on participatory 
methods and proposed new ways of working in development projects, and it was 
welcomed by outsiders as well as by a growing number of social development 
professionals at the Bank (Long, 2001; Bebbington et al., 2005).   
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The Bank focused in participatory beneficiary assessments and participatory 
formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Implementation of participation in 
projects formally came with the Community-Based Development (CBD) and 
Community-Driven Development (CDD)7 approaches, which have become increasingly 
important at the institution (OED, 2005: 82).  
 
Social Funds or Community-Driven Development?  
The distinction between CDD and Social Funds is a complicated one. As it has 
been noted, Social Funds are an instrument that uses the CDD approach in program 
design and implementation. However, Social Fund programs precede CDD by almost a 
decade in the World Bank’s programmatic theory and practice.  De Silva and Sum 
(2008: 1) note that the term ‘social fund’ was originally a generic term used to describe 
multi-sector, demand-driven mechanisms financed by the MFIs, dating back to the 
1980s. As these programs became more popular, the term was used more and more to 
describe projects linked to the Social Protection unit of the Bank. At the same time, 
similar programs, based on demand-based mechanisms, were established by other units 
at the Bank (especially the Social Development Network).  
According to De Silva and Sum (2008: 1-2), Community-Driven Development 
was the term coined internally when, in 2000, an effort was made to understand the 
potential of these programs within poverty reduction strategies. CDD included a broad 
range of interventions characterized by transferring control over resources and decision-
making from central agencies to communities (Dongier et. al, 2002: 3). Thus, CDD 
became the encompassing approach where the theoretical support for Social Fund 
programs lies. The CDD approach will be studied in the next chapter.  
 
1.3.4. Beyond Participation? The critiques to Participatory Approaches 
Since the end of the 90s, the participatory approach has been challenged on many 
grounds. Contrary to the claims that participation in development interventions 
                                                 
7
 Although there is not clear-cut distinction between them, especially when it comes to practice, it is increasingly 
assumed that CDD projects give communities control over decisions and resources while CBD emphasizes 
collaboration, consultation and information sharing with them (OED, 2005: xi). 
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contributes to project success and sustainability as well as ‘empowerment’ of the 
participants, many have contested that participation has serious flaws that need to be 
addressed. Thus, in many cases, “the banner of ‘participation’ has been waved over 
projects that were, at best thinly participatory or, at worst, smokescreens for elite 
control” (Crocker, 2008: 339). Participation might actually not be ‘good in itself’ unless 
adjustments are made to the way it is implemented. Some have argued that participation 
should be discarded completely and new ‘alternative’ approaches should be found to 
improve development interventions (Cooke and Kothari, 2001a). Others have argued 
that participation has to move beyond its current applications to have a transformative 
role for citizenship and governance (Hickey and Mohan, 2004)  
In general, the critiques to participation can be summarized in what Cooke and 
Kothari (2001b) have called the three ‘tyrannies’ of participation. Thus, the “tyranny of 
decision-making and control” argues that ‘local knowledge’ is structured by external 
project needs; participation is then ultimately used to legitimize the priorities of the 
donors and development agencies. The “tyranny of the group” refers to group dynamics 
that reinforce the interest of the already powerful, while the poor are still deprived of 
real voice in development priorities by the intrinsic power imbalances within the 
community. Finally, the “tyranny of the method” proposes that ‘participation’ has 
become the only accepted approach, and other methods that could provide for the pitfalls 
of participation approaches have been discarded.  
As a response to this type of critiques some have argued that a broader 
transformative notion of participation has to be attempted to move beyond the 
routinisation of participatory exercises in development and public sector agencies 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2004). These arguments look at participation as a right of 
citizenship with the potential for transforming the political relations between citizens 
and governments (Christens and Speers, 2006: n.a.).  
 
This Chapter presented an overview of Social Funds and their evolution as 
instruments to implement projects through a participatory approach. With respect to 
MFIs’ practice, these programs can be considered pioneers of a demand-based approach 
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that has evolved into a set of principles contained in the CDD approach. Participatory 
approaches have been a part of development since its inception, although they were 
more or less ignored by ‘big development’ institutions until the 1990s. They face now a 
series of critiques, since many argued that the ‘participation label’ might obscure power 
differences between development agencies and the beneficiaries as well as within the 
community. The critiques to participation, their theoretical postulates and empirical 
implications are essential for the focus of this research and will be analyzed more in-
depth in the following Chapter. For that, the chapter will first introduce key concepts 
and categories for participation and will situate Social Funds and the CDD approach.  
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 CHAPTER 2. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
As the previous chapter illustrates, it is difficult to pin down one single ‘theory of 
participation’. Furthermore, since participation is a highly contextual term, it is possible to find 
several definitions of it depending on the organizational culture or the perspective used to 
define it. The American Heritage Dictionary defines participation as “the act of taking part or 
sharing in something”. This simple term becomes more intricate when applied to the specific 
context of development interventions. This section intends to get a better understanding of the 
dimensions of participation within the development context. 
 
2.1. DEFINING PARTICIPATION: KEY CONCEPTS 
Jennings defines participation as the “involvement by local populations in the creation, 
content and conduct of a program or policy designed to change their lives” (Jennings, 2000: 
1). This definition does not refer to what level of involvement of the local people is considered 
participatory as well as it does not take into consideration the aim that participation is to 
achieve. The author adds that, under the “belief that citizens can be trusted to shape their own 
future, participatory development uses local decision making and capacities to steer and define 
the nature of the intervention” (Jennings, 2000: 1). Taking into account the capacity of local 
people to undertake their own development, this statement proposes that participatory 
processes utilize ‘local-knowledge’ to the service of better development interventions since 
participation “increases the odds that a program will be on target and its results will more 
likely be sustainable” (Jennings, 2000: 2).  As we have seen, this is indeed one of the aims of 
participation, although it falls short from other notions that consider participation as a tool to 
empower local people.   
The World Bank defines participation as the “process through which primary 
stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource 
allocations and access to public goods and services”8. This definition, although acknowledging 
                                                 
8
 (World Bank Participation and Civic Engagement Group’s Website, 2007). For the World Bank, “key stakeholders 
are clearly those intended to be directly affected by a proposed intervention, i.e. those who may be expected to benefit 
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a degree of control of primary stakeholders, also lacks a dimension that considers the aims of 
the participatory processes.  
The definition given by Foster and utilized by GTZ notes that  
Participation is seen as a principle to promote initiative, self-determination and 
the taking over of responsibility by beneficiaries, thus representing a critical 
factor for meeting a project’s objective. Increasingly, however, […] the term [has 
to be] understood as a socio-political process concerning the relationships 
between different stakeholders in a society, such as social groups, community, 
policy level and service delivering institutions. In this meaning participation aims 
at an increase in self-determination and re-adjustment of control over 
development initiatives and resources. (Forster, 1998 in Long, 2001: 15) 9 
 
The differences in the three definitions would reflect what has come to be known as 
the means/ends distinction between the aims of participation. Thus, the first two definitions 
consider participation as a means to accomplish the project goals more efficiently and with 
more sustainable results. The third definition, while recognizing the ‘means’ dimension refers 
to participation as an encompassing ‘socio-political’ process where relations among different 
actors of development are taken into account. In this definition, participation also seeks to ‘re-
adjust’ the power relations (“control”) and to contribute to self-determination, both closely 
related to ‘empowerment’10. Participation as an end in itself refers to the use of participation as 
an empowering tool for local people to lead their own development.  
The means/end discussion shares some resemblances with the distinction made 
between instrumental and transformative participation, where instrumental participation aims 
at ensuring project sustainability, community commitment and cost-sharing in development 
interventions (McGee, 2002: 100) This category is referred by some as participation as a 
means for better project results (Long, C., 2001:18). Transformative participation refers to a 
type of participation that enables people to decide their development priorities and to take 
control of it, as a means to empowerment and ownership, which would also lead to better 
project results. In the context of this research, the instrumental/transformative distinction is 
                                                                                                                                                
or loose from Bank-supported operations”. The term primary stakeholder is used to refer to “poor and marginalized 
people” (In Long, 2001: 14-16).  
9
 Italics added. 
10Empowerment is understood here as “the process of communities equipping themselves with the knowledge, skills 
and resources they need in order to change and improve the quality of their own lives and their community. 
Empowerment may come from within or it may be facilitated and supported through external agencies“. (Source: 
www.quest-net.org listed in References) 
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preferred, since it is considered that even when participation is aimed at empowering people, it 
is still a means to achieve it. In that light, the means/ends dichotomy would not be useful to 
understand the goal of participation since the proposition that participation is the end in itself is 
difficult to hold, especially from a participant’s perspective. If people participate, it can be 
assumed that the participants are seeking to obtain a benefit from that participation (even when 
this is not a material benefit but it is related to self-satisfaction, prestige or satisfying altruist 
needs).  
Another distinction is defined as participation in projects and participation in 
development. According to McGee, this distinction refers to different ‘schools’ of 
participation, where participation in projects is the approach utilized by the ‘orthodoxy’, and 
participation in development is the approach held by the alternative movement’s scholars and 
practitioners. The latter seeks to “enable poor people to define what sort of development they 
aspire to, and to become empowered” (McGee, 2002: 100) through the participatory process. 
Participation in projects, in turn, would seek to include participation in a process designed and 
managed by external agencies.  
These distinctions carry, implicitly, the idea that one of the categories is ‘more 
participatory’ than the other. Then, there is a risk of over-simplifying the mainstream-
alternative development dichotomy as one where major donors and agencies, i.e. the ‘big 
development’ institutions or ‘orthodoxy’, are caught in the participation in projects view and 
utilize participation as instrumental to only obtain better project results, whereas the 
participation in development school focuses only in empowerment. As proposed by Parfitt 
(2004: 540-541),  
No agency can afford to completely ignore participation, just as no agency can 
afford a completely cavalier attitude to the need to achieve at least some 
measurable development objectives. Even the most top-down orientated 
organization wants to engender some participation in its projects [...] while those 
agencies that are concerned with empowerment want at least some measurable 
benefits to accrue to those that they empower. 
Furthermore, every development intervention implies the presence of an external 
agent and thus, participation becomes an exercise in which people are invited to take part. If 
we stick to the differentiation mentioned above, it becomes difficult to find development 
initiatives that are not ‘participation in projects’ (self-mobilization being the only one that is 
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not included in an externally designed intervention). In this sense, McGee (2002: 92) notes, 
“the exercise of agency only becomes participation when the impetus or framework for a 
development activity is located outside people’s life worlds”11. Accordingly, the distinction 
would only be relevant for the debate because it leads us to pay attention to the fact that the 
external agencies and facilitators are crucial to the process. The way in which they design their 
own intervention would make this process more or less participatory, being to a certain extent, 
in their control to change that. As Bathnagar and Williams have noted, “people do not 
participate in external interventions; they live their lives. External interventions interfere in 
their lives and, therefore, the onus lies on external agencies, not people, to devise methods to 
participate” (Bathnagar and Williams, 1992 in McGee, 2002: 92). 
This research will understand participation as the process through which key 
stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, design, resource allocation 
and implementation of a development intervention 12. The purpose of that participation 
might be instrumental or transformative, the latter tending to achieve more sustainable effects 
and benefits by changing some of the constraints the target population might face to get 
involved and be active participants. Furthermore, key stakeholders take part of an intervention 
whose initial impulses come from outside their lives’ frameworks, from the development 
agency. 
It is important to note that there are different ‘types’ of participation according to 
different levels of involvement. Thus, participation levels range from purely informative or 
consultative levels, to collaborative or empowering levels where the individuals’ share of 
decision-making power. Long (2001:16) follows the World Bank’s categories for identifying 
the mechanisms that correspond to each level of participation (Box 2.1.). These categories 
imply that some forms are ‘more participatory’ than others, according to the different levels of 
involvement of the beneficiaries. In addition, the mechanisms progressively include the less 
participatory tools and characteristics into more participatory forms. However, the disclaimer 
is that, usually, some forms of participation might be more appropriate than others in different 
contexts.  
                                                 
11
 Agency refers here to the individual capacity of being an „agent“ in the sense of being „someone who acts and 
brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not 
we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well“ (Sen, 1999, p. 19).  
12
 Adapted from World Bank definition.   
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Table 2.1. Participation Mechanisms 
Mechanism Tools and Characteristics  
Information-Sharing  
Mechanism 
-Translation into local languages and dissemination of written 
material using various media.  
- Informational seminars, presentation and public meetings. 
Consultative Mechanism - Consultative meetings. 
- Field visits and interviews (at various stages of the work) 
Joint Assessment 
Mechanism 
- Participatory assessments and evaluations 
- Beneficiary assessment 
Shared- Decision  
Mechanism 
- Participatory planning techniques 
- Workshops and retreats to discuss and determine positions, 
priorities, roles. 
- Meetings to help resolve conflicts, to seek arrangements, and 
engender ownership. 
- (Public) reviews of draft documents and subsequent revisions.  
Collaborative 
Mechanism 
- Formation of joint committees with stakeholder 
representatives.  
- Formation of joint groups, task forces. 
- Joint work with user groups, intermediary organizations, and 
other stakeholder groups.  
- Stakeholder groups given principal responsibility for 
implementation 
Empowering  
Mechanism 
- Capacity-building of stakeholder organizations 
- Strengthening the financial and legal status of stakeholder 
organizations 
- Hand-over and self-management by stakeholders 
- Support for new, spontaneous initiatives by stakeholders  
Source: World Bank, 1994b in Long, C., 2001, p.16 
 
In spite of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve different degrees of participation, 
it is important to bear in mind that participation can entail formal and substantive inclusion. 
Formal inclusion “concerns the extent to which different [local stakeholders] are able to enter 
decision-making arenas” (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005: 4), in the sense of being formally 
admitted, without necessarily having the power to influence the process. Substantive 
inclusion refers, in turn, to the “extent to which different participants are able to voice their 
views and the extent to which these are taken into consideration by other participants” 
(Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005: 4). This is a relevant distinction that seeks to explore more into 
the functioning of participatory mechanisms. It allows incorporating to the ‘measurement’ of 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
participation, concerns related to the ‘real’ participation of weak or marginalized people or 
groups vis-à-vis more powerful ones.  
 
2.2. COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL FUNDS THEORY 
2.2.1. The Community-Driven Development Approach 
Social Funds are instruments that in most cases use the Community-Driven 
Development (CDD) approach to implement development interventions. CDD refers to 
community-based projects in which “communities have direct control over key project 
decisions as well as [in some cases] the management of investment funds” (Mansuri, and 
Rao, 2003: 2). Community means here the ‘group’ within a particular local context to which 
the intervention is ‘targeted’ (target group). In Social Funds, this target group participates in 
government or donor financed programs, and works together with them to develop 
interventions that help meeting the community’s priorities in education, health and other social 
and economic infrastructure. ‘Preference targeting’ is defined as the extent to which the 
preferences of the community (needs and priorities) are met by the intervention.  
Dongier et al. (2002) describe CDD as a mechanism that can: (i) Enhance 
sustainability; (ii) Improve efficiency and effectiveness; (iii) Allow poverty reduction efforts 
to be taken to scale; (iv) Make development more inclusive; and (v) Empower poor people, 
build social capital, and strengthen governance. They claim that CDD achieves this by (among 
other things): (a) reducing the information problems that face both the project facilitator and 
beneficiaries by eliciting development priorities directly from target communities and 
allowing target communities to identify projects; and by (b) strengthening the civic capacities 
of communities by nurturing representative organizations, and by enabling them to acquire 
skills and organizational abilities that strengthen their capacity for collective action. According 
to Mansuri and Rao (2003: 2), 
CDD […] has the explicit objective of reversing existing power relations 
in a manner that creates agency and voice for the poor, while allowing the poor to 
have more control over development assistance. It is expected that this will result 
in the allocation of development funds in a manner that is more responsive to the 
needs of the poor, better targeting of poverty programs, more responsive 
government and better delivery of public goods and services, better maintained 
community assets, and a more informed and involved citizenry that is capable of 
undertaking self-initiated development activity. 
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Thus, CDD aims at achieving better project outcomes and empowerment of local 
populations through a participatory process that involves joint assessment, shared-decision, 
collaborative, and empowering mechanisms. It holds a view of participation in projects that is 
both instrumental and transformative, considering both issues of project sustainability and 
success, as well as empowerment of the individuals that take part of the process.  
 
2.2.2. Community Participation in Social Funds  
According to a recent publication (Van Domelen, 2006, 186), the way by which 
Social Funds incorporate participation and demand-driven approaches into their design has 
changed over the years. Van Domelen notes that “having once been interpreted as ‘proposals 
come from the community’, ‘demand-driven’ is now often taken to mean that project 
proposals are identified in an open, participatory and egalitarian way by a fully informed 
citizenry, and reflect the top priority of the majority of the community members” (World 
Bank, 2002 in Van Domelen, 2006: 192). This is indeed a ‘raising of the bar’ for a 
definition of participation within Social Funds, but one that requires that many more 
institutional and organizational mechanisms be in place to ensure that this happens in practice.  
Regarding the particular focus of this research, there have been some studies that are 
important to note down on the issue of participation in Social Funds. A cross-country impact 
evaluation carried by the World Bank (Rawlings et al., 2004) found that Social Fund projects 
in six countries largely reflected community priorities. The study goes on to say that  
[…] communities tend to be very involved in the identification of 
investments, and only slightly less involved during the execution. During 
execution, between one-third and two-thirds of citizens report participating, 
depending on the country, usually by contributing to the project’s management or 
by donating labour, materials or cash (Rawlings et al., 2004: xxi). 
However, this study notes that participation fell off significantly in the project design 
phase (Rawlings et al., 2004: 148). It was argued that specialized or technical knowledge 
was required at this stage, especially since many projects involve the provision of some sort of 
infrastructure. However, a low degree of participation at this stage could jeopardize the entire 
sustainability of the project; especially if cultural, social or economic characteristics of a 
particular local reality are not taken into account.  
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Another study by the World Bank focuses on the design of Social Fund programs and 
its impact on participation and demand orientation (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997). The study is 
based on the review of staff appraisals reports for 51 projects at the Bank. In spite of being 
limited by the information contained in the appraisals and other information from interviews 
with task managers at the World Bank, this is a very comprehensive study on Social Funds 
that has the merit of putting the emphasis in the design phase of these programs. The study 
notes that Social Funds “score high in the extent to which the sub-project cycle is geared 
towards community participation”. Unlike Rawlings et al., this study finds that 90 percent of 
projects “make some attempt to involve community-level actors in the [...] planning of sub-
projects”. However, Narayan and Ebbe find that only one third of the projects mentioned “the 
need to ensure representation of vulnerable groups, including the poor, women and indigenous 
people”. Very few projects mention mechanisms by which participation of ‘community-level 
actors’, let alone vulnerable groups, would be achieved. The study concludes that the weakest 
elements in the design of Social Funds are investment in local organizational capacity, lack of 
arrangements for monitoring participation, demand and progress in local organizational 
capacity. 
The mentioned studies are different in nature, since the former measures levels of 
participation whereas the latter addresses issues Social Funds program design without 
measuring participation in practice. Nevertheless, these studies show that many challenges 
persist with the Social Fund model. Particular questions remain not only on the study of Social 
Funds design but also on the influence of that design at the community level. The following 
section will assess where the main problems of participation in projects may lie, according to 
different theoretical arguments.   
 
2.3. THE CRITIQUES TO PARTICIPATION 
Participation in development interventions is not free from problems. The body of 
concerns about participation can be divided in those that come from ‘inside’ the field of 
‘participation proponents and practitioners’ and seek to adjust participatory methodologies to 
meet their expected goals, and those critiques that come from ‘outside’ and seek to ‘re-adjust’ 
the current importance that participation has in the development discipline. On the latter, 
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McGee has noted that “few of the destructive critiques offer any comparison of outcomes 
achieved via participatory techniques with outcomes achieved using other techniques; nor do 
most propose plausible alternatives” (McGee, 2002: p.108). Nevertheless, it is important to 
analyze what the pitfalls of participation might be, in order to understand how processes and 
outcomes can be affected by these constraints in Social Funds. 
Among the early proponents of PRA/PLA, Chambers has been one of the main 
authors to warn about the dangers of badly applied participatory methodologies. To this 
author, the problems lie in the ways participation is implemented, and not in an intrinsic pitfall 
of the approach itself. His concerns and analysis try to deal with the consequences the rapid 
spread of these methodologies might have for the quality of participatory processes.   
The critiques from ‘outside’ are articulated around various propositions that have 
been well summarized in the book Participation: the new Tyranny? (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001a). The word tyranny evokes strong feelings and the authors have justified both its 
attention-seeking aim as well as its accuracy, since, they argue, tyranny is one of the counter-
intuitive potential consequences of participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001b: 3-4). They 
identify three particular sets of tyrannies: a) ‘the tyranny of decision-making and control’ by 
which facilitators would override existing legitimate decision-making processes at the local 
level; b) ‘the tyranny of the group’ by which group dynamics would lead to participatory 
decisions that reinforce the interest of the already powerful and c) ‘the tyranny of the method’ 
by which participatory methods have displaced other methods which might be more 
appropriate in some contexts (Cooke and Kothari, 2001b: 7-8). Perhaps articulated in a 
less radical way, the critiques raised in the first two types of ‘tyrannies’ have been 
identified by many scholars and practitioners from both ‘sides’. They will serve as the 
as the basis to summarize the main line of this research and will be addressed 
accordingly in the following sections.  
The ‘tyranny of the method’ proposes that the pitfalls of the other two are 
reinforced by a disregard of alternative methods, since participatory methodologies have 
become the sine-qua-non of development interventions, and other alternatives have been 
discarded. This proposition could be considered rather extreme, since it would not be possible 
to say that, for example, all projects at the World Bank and other MFIs are dominated by the 
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participatory approach. Furthermore, this ‘tyranny of the method’, as articulated by its 
proponents, risks confusing the problems in the implementation of participatory methods with 
the theory of the method itself. This discussion brings to light an intrinsic problem that 
participatory methodologies critiques face, i.e. there is rarely a clear distinction between the 
participatory approach’s ‘theory’ and the way it is implemented. In other words, participatory 
methods are usually blamed for the pitfalls of the practitioners and institutions that implement 
them (McGee, 2002: 107). On that light, and being the focus of this study only to assess the 
role of the ‘external agents’ in making ‘participation more participatory’, this research will 
not deal with the ‘tyranny of the method’.  
 
2.3.1. Participation and the Implementing Agency’s Perspective 
The ‘tyranny’ critique suggests that in practice local knowledge (i.e. community 
needs, priorities and plans) is structured by the ‘project needs’ and by external planning 
processes. In addition, it is claimed, “participatory ideals are often operationally constrained 
by institutional contexts that require formal and informal bureaucratic goals to be met” 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001b: 8). In this regard, some have argued that the agency facilitating 
the participatory process is not impartial and has its own pragmatic policy interest such as 
cost effective delivery of services or goods (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 8). Participation would 
ultimately be used to legitimize the priorities of the external agencies.  
Mosse (2001: 16-35) identifies various instances at which participation would be 
constrained by the external agency. First, he argues that, through participatory processes, 
‘outsider agendas’ get expressed as local knowledge. External agencies “own the research 
tools, choose the topics, record the information, and abstract and summarize according to 
project criteria” (Mosse, 2001: 19). Consequently, project facilitators are in a position to 
influence the shaping of needs by local people. Communities then express their needs based 
on the perceptions of what the agency is able to deliver.  
Moreover, Mosse (2001: 24) argues that, as a consequence of organizational and 
institutional constraints, “people’s planning is manipulated by external agencies”. According 
to the author, the project would be influenced by the need of the external agency to interact 
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with a wide range of actors (i.e. the community, donors, and government agencies) and to find 
‘acceptable’ solutions for all of them.  
In addition, there are organizational systems and procedures that would affect the 
work of project managers and facilitators (e.g. budgeting time frames, procedures for 
approval, etc.). This means that “fieldworkers working under pressure to ‘keep up 
momentum’, to meet expenditure targets and to maximize quantifiable achievements may find 
themselves giving priority to familiar, conventional programs over innovative initiatives 
where approval may be uncertain or delayed” (Mosse, 2001: 24) .  
It is important to note that Chambers (1994: 1441-2), in 1994, had already referred to 
the major dangers that the particular approach of PRA/PLA faced in its implementation, 
namely: a) ‘instant fashion’ and the possible discredit of the approach by rapid adoption, 
followed by misuse, and using the label without the substance; b) ‘rushing’ in participatory 
processes; c) ‘formalism’ and a need to codify and standardize, which is an inherent problem 
to innovations, specially when they are ‘institutionalized’ and particularly problematic for an 
approach that is based in flexibility of application; d) ‘routinisation’ and a decrease in 
innovation to find new options to apply participatory methodologies. According to the author, 
“normal bureaucratic tendencies to standardize, centralize, and impose top-down targets 
impede or prevent the open-endedness, flexibility, creativity and diversity of good PRA” 
(Chambers, 1994: 1447).  
Acknowledging the role of facilitators and managers at the external agency, 
Chambers argues that a key element lies in the commitment of this staff towards participation. 
According to the author,  
Training [on participatory methodologies] at lower field levels without 
higher-level understanding and commitment has proved ineffective. It 
appears critical for adoption that the middle-level managerial staff in any 
organization genuinely, and not just verbally, wishes to use or support PRA. 
If the staff does not, there are many ways in which its lack of support can 
undermine and finally eliminate the participatory spirit and practices of 
PRA. […] The bottom line in organizations has been, however, individual 
choice and freedom. Much has depended on facilitators who were both 
committed and free of line responsibilities. (Chambers, 1994: 1447)13 
 
                                                 
13
 Italics added. 
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In addition, some of the agency’s characteristics, such as organizational culture and 
implementation styles, would influence the application of participatory methodologies. 
Chambers (1994: 1447) notes that this problem has proven particularly important in 
government organizations that are less flexible and require a change in attitudes and 
behaviours, as well as in their operation. Thus,   
More resistance to [PRA’s] adoption and spread has been found in 
organizations with strong top-down authority and hierarchy, evaluative and 
punitive styles, and repetitive routines and actions. Conversely, the most 
rapid and effective adoption and development of PRA has been in 
organizations with democratic management, lateral communication, and 
flexible and adaptive modes of operation (Chambers, 1994: 1447, Italics 
added).   
 
Experience has shown that the organizations in which PRA/PLA has been more 
easily adopted share common characteristics: a stable leadership committed to participatory 
approaches; a majority of the staff wishing to use PRA/PLA; little rent-seeking activity by 
staff; and recurrent reinforcement (Chambers, 1994: 1448).  
Thus, the organizational and institutional context of the implementing agency could 
influence participatory processes in a way that alters project design and outcomes, i.e. the real 
needs or priorities of the community would not be addressed. As external agents ‘own’ the 
project and the methods, they would influence ‘local knowledge’ formation and local people 
would demand what they think they can get, which might not be what they really need. 
Moreover, bureaucratic and institutional pressures could lead to the ‘external agents’ by-
passing or ‘manipulating’ the participatory process in order to achieve measurable results that 
they can exhibit to donors and other actors. In addition, Chambers suggests that government 
organizations have more difficulties in implementing participatory processes. Some specific 
characteristics within the organizational context of the external agency may increase 
probabilities of success in application of PRA/PLA and other participatory methodologies. 
These issues are relevant for the study of Social Funds as they might serve to identify 
institutional and organizational elements that foster community participation.  
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2.3.2. The Community Perspective: Who participates?   
Mansuri and Rao (2003: 10) note that, when the term community is employed, it is 
usually a simplification made by external actors (agencies, governments, donors) in order to 
define the “project parameters”. There are, however, two main problems with the 
indiscriminate use of this term: a) the geographical or conceptual boundaries of a community 
are not always easy to define, since administrative boundaries can be meaningless when other 
ethnic, religious or settlement patterns are in place; b) a community is not a homogeneous 
entity and assuming so may overlook economic, social and gender differences that ultimately 
define power relations within the community14.  
As noted earlier, the ‘tyranny of the group’ proposes that participation processes at 
the community level are affected by group dynamics that reinforce existing power differences 
and deprive the less powerful (that is, in general, the poor and women) of real ‘voice’ in this 
process (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 1-15). It has also been argued, “participation might lead 
to psychological and physical duress for the most socially and economically disadvantaged 
[…] since genuine participation for [them] may require the taking of positions that are 
contrary to the interest of the most powerful groups” (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 8). 
Chambers (1994: 1444-8) argues that one of the most important challenges that can 
compromise the quality and outcomes of participatory process is the belief that participation 
by itself would empower, regardless of who participate. Participation should not be regarded 
as intrinsically good; as social and gender differences at the local level could be carried into 
participatory process. It is necessary to consider who gains from it and if vulnerable and 
marginalized groups are also able to participate and to ‘be empowered’ in the process. 
Specific measures might need to be taken to ensure participation of marginalized and 
vulnerable people.  
As noted, participation can refer to ‘formal inclusion’, which does not ensure that the 
people in the process have the possibility of effectively influencing its outcome (‘substantive 
inclusion’). Since, most times, communities are not homogeneous; the access to information 
or to certain instances of participation might be substantially, although not formally, voided to 
some individuals, based in social or gender differences. In this regard, the external agency 
                                                 
14
 ‘Community’ will be used in the context of this research as a ‘target group’ or the group participating in the project, bearing in 
mind the two caveats mentioned. 
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implementing the project has a role in the design of mechanisms that allow both formal and 
substantive inclusion for community members.  
Finally, many participatory projects usually require communities to make an in- kind 
or cash contribution towards it. This mechanism has been praised as a characteristic which 
contributes to project ownership and sustainability (Dongier et al., 2002: 24). However, if 
not properly structured, these contributions could be a serious factor hindering participation of 
the most disadvantaged individuals in the community. If some of the costs of the projects are 
shifted to the beneficiaries, the poorer could be forced to make “contributions that are far 
more substantial than those made by the rich” (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 9). In most cases, an 
in-cash contribution can be prohibitive while in-kind contributions can discourage 
participation by requiring to sacrifice present income-generating activities towards future 
uncertain recompenses. In this line, it is important to look at how those contribution schemes 
are designed within the project.  
Participation could then be influenced by social and gender differences within the 
community. In turn, this might have consequences for both the way needs and priorities are 
articulated in projects as well as for the assumption that participation would lead to 
empowerment of the poor and marginalized. As it has been proposed, it would be necessary 
that the agency together with the community devise methods to lessen the impact of these 
differences. In order to assess community participation, it is relevant to keep in mind the 
mentioned constraints when analyzing Social Funds design.   
 
2.4. CDD/SOCIAL FUNDS PRINCIPLES FOR PARTICIPATION  
Within the CDD approach some principles have been identified that can foster 
participation in community-driven projects. It is useful to examine these principles as a basis 
for the study of Social Funds this research sets out to do. Dongier et al.15 argue that relevant 
principles that should guide policy formulation and program design to enhance the 
effectiveness and sustainability of CDD interventions are as follows. 
1. Establish an enabling environment through relevant institutional and policy reform: 
refers to the policies, laws, systems, and governance processes that encourage effective 
                                                 
15
 The principles and their descriptions in the following pages follow the general arguments proposed by Dongier et al, 
2002: 22-29. 
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collaboration among government, civil society, service providers, and Community-Based 
Organizations (CBOs) or community groups. 
2. Make investments responsive to informed demand: communities should have access 
to sufficient information to weigh tradeoffs and make realistic choices from a range of options 
that meet their needs and fit local conditions, culture, values, and available operation and 
maintenance capacity. Furthermore, community co-financing may be an important factor in 
building ownership and in helping to ensure that appropriate choices are made and 
investments are sustainable. 
3. Build participatory mechanisms for community control and stakeholder 
involvement: Communities that have ownership of a project or program would be more likely 
to sustain outcomes. This implies providing inclusive community groups with knowledge, 
control, and authority over decisions and resources throughout all phases.  
4. Ensure social and gender inclusion: CDD needs to be responsive to the priorities of 
all poor groups and to be designed to be socially inclusive, giving voice and decision-making 
responsibility to disadvantaged groups  
5. Invest in capacity building of CBOs: The impact of CDD programs is directly 
related to the strength of the CBOs or community groups driving the process. Training and 
capacity building of CBOs through “learning by doing” should thus be an important 
component of CDD programs.  
6. Develop simple rules and strong incentives, supported by monitoring and 
evaluation: Community access to resources needs to be governed by simple rules that are easy 
for participating communities to interpret and apply. In addition, key actors at all levels should 
be rewarded for performance through objective evaluation based on clear criteria.  Systematic 
monitoring and evaluation of program processes and outcomes are critical to ensure that 
programs continue to grow and adapt to changing conditions. 
7. Maintain flexibility in design of arrangements: Flexible program planning and 
decentralized decision-making mechanisms, situated as close to the community as possible, 
facilitate quick response to change. 
These principles are important since they point out to ‘ideal’ elements that Social 
Funds and CDD projects should aim at. It is clear that it is far more complicated to implement 
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programs that can actually fulfil all these requirements as there might be dynamics on the 
implementing agency side, as well as in the community side, that have to be addressed 
beforehand. Nevertheless, they are a theoretical guide to the practice, and will be relevant in 
the design of the empirical part of this research.  
 
2.5. SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS 
The main theoretical arguments described so far will be summarized here with 
two purposes, i.e. to distil some of the key conclusions from the concepts discussed 
above in the form of a more coherent theoretical framework; and, to serve as the basis 
for the research objectives and questions that will be developed in the following chapter. 
Community participation is understood here as the process through which people 
from a target local group influence and share control over priority setting, design, 
resource allocation and implementation of a development intervention. The involvement 
of the target group might aim to ensure project sustainability and improving overall 
project results (instrumental participation) as well as to create greater empowerment and 
project ownership at the local level (transformative participation).  
It is proposed here that local groups participate in interventions that are framed in 
a program located at an instance outside the community (external development agency). 
This translates into an active role of the external agency for devising the mechanisms for 
participation. These mechanisms can be more or less inclusive, ranging across a 
continuum that goes from Information-sharing, Consultative or Joint Assessment 
mechanisms to Shared-Decision, Collaborative or Empowering mechanisms. Moreover, 
any participation mechanism can entail two forms of inclusion: one that is formal and 
refers only to the possibility of entering the participation spaces; and, another one that is 
substantive and refers to the possibilities of expressing opinions and influencing the 
process.  
The Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach to participation 
originated at the World Bank and serves as the ‘theory’ to Social Fund interventions. 
The CDD approach proposes that communities have control over key project issues as 
well as the management of resources in development interventions. Under this scheme, 
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the aim of participation is to ensure project sustainability, improve effectiveness and 
empower local people by reducing the information gap between the project facilitator 
(external agent) and the beneficiaries (local agent), and strengthening local capacity for 
collective action.  
Social Funds programs rely on the CDD model to accomplish their goals by 
financing small projects whose priority, design and implementation are controlled to a 
certain degree by local populations. In this sense, it is relevant to look at the scrutiny that 
participatory approaches are undergoing. Some of these arguments identify two main 
dynamics within the external agency context that might affect participation processes. 
First, it is claimed that the external agency as well as the facilitators have their own 
priorities and ‘own’ the participatory tools and the project. They can influence the 
planning process at the community, whose members ultimately shape their needs 
according to what they think they can obtain from the agency.  
The second dynamic that constrains the implementation of participation refers to 
formal and informal bureaucratic goals within the agency’s organizational and 
institutional context. Some organizational and system pressures might affect the job of 
managers and facilitators and they might end up privileging methods that are not 
participatory, but can accrue some quantifiable results. Lastly, within its institutional 
context, the agency has to find acceptable solutions for all of its stakeholders, which 
might compromise its work with the community.  
According to Chambers, the organizational culture and the implementation style 
of the external agency have an influence in participatory projects implementation 
(Chambers, 1994: 1447). Bureaucratic tendencies to standardize, centralize and impose 
top-down targets hinder a correct application of participatory methods; and, 
organizations that are less flexible and have strong top-down authority and hierarchy 
styles might have a greater tendency to these problems (Chambers, 1994: 1447). 
Lastly, another challenge to the implementation of participatory processes lies in 
the community itself. Communities are not homogeneous entities that are easily defined 
within geographic borders. Differences within the community might hinder possibilities 
to participate for some individuals. Here, the external agency also has a role in devising 
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mechanisms that lessen the possible negative effect of these problems within the 
communities.  
Some principles have been identified that might help counteract the effects of 
faults in design and implementation. It appears that the organizations where PRA has 
been more easily adopted have shown to have a stable leadership committed to 
participatory approaches and a majority of the staff wishing to use the method 
(Chambers, 1994: 1448). On a similar line, CDD proponents have also pointed out some 
principles for program design that might help counteract the problems of 
implementation. Some of these key principles are: a) Establish an enabling institutional 
environment; b) Make investments responsive to informed demand; c) Ensure social and 
gender inclusion; and d) Maintain flexibility in design of arrangements. 
This research intends to assess the incidence of the mentioned constraints on 
community participation in Social Funds. The questions, assumptions and goals on 
which this research relies are developed in the next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
One of the main principles on which the Social Funds model rests is the design and 
implementation of projects by the community. This type of participation is expected to 
contribute to development interventions that more accurately reflect the needs of the 
beneficiaries (specially ‘the poor’ and vulnerable) by meeting the community’s priorities (i.e. a 
more accurate preference targeting), and by generating greater project ownership and 
sustainability. Overall, this would lead to better project performance.  
However, as noted in previous chapters, community participation processes might face 
challenges arising from the organizational system, implementation style and institutional 
environment of the Social Fund agency.  If these challenges become constraints for the 
application of participatory processes, they could jeopardize the presumed benefits of such 
processes.  
This research draws from these arguments and has the main objective of assessing the 
role of the Social Fund agency’s organizational system and institutional context in community 
participation processes. By doing so, it aims at identifying key organizational and program 
design characteristics and institutional context elements that can influence the implementation 
of participatory processes in Social Funds. The research expects to answer the following 
questions: 
• Do the Social Fund agency’s organizational and institutional contexts influence 
community participation in Social Funds?  
• If so, which key organizational and institutional characteristics have a greater 
influence on participation processes?  
In order to answer these questions, the research will look at three aspects of the 
organizational and institutional context and will focus on some specific questions within those 
aspects: 
a) The Organizational System and Procedures might be designed in a way that 
affects overall possibilities for communities to participate in Social Fund projects. Are 
Social Funds’ program design and organizational procedures geared towards 
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supporting community participation? Are Social Funds’ organizational policies and 
systems flexible and adaptive? 
b) Social Fund Staff might not be prepared, have incentives and/or be committed to 
design and implement community participation processes, thus affecting community 
participation in Social Fund projects. Is the Social Fund staff16 trained, committed 
and/or motivated to design and implement participatory processes at community 
level? 
c)  Institutional Environment. How do key actors in the institutional environment 
of the agency influence community participation processes? Specifically, do local 
authorities and local indigenous institutions influence participation in Social Fund 
projects? 
This research will also analyze Community Participation in Social Fund Projects, 
defined as the degree of influence and control by the target group over priority setting, design, 
resource allocation and implementation of a Social Fund project. The analysis of this aspect 
will take into account that there are different levels of participation that range from access to 
information, opportunity to express opinions, and possibilities to take part in decision-making 
and/or in representation spaces. These levels can refer to formal or substantive inclusion and 
may differ according to individual or group differences within the community (social and 
gender inclusion).  
Finally, it is important to note that this research assumes that participatory methods 
have a positive impact on project outcomes. As it was discussed in the theoretical part of this 
study, community participation may increase the odds that a project will more accurately 
target the beneficiaries’ needs and priorities (preference targeting) and increase ownership and 
sustainability. This research assumes that the problems of community participation lie in 
implementation pitfalls and not in the method itself. However, as the research will mainly use 
a qualitative data collection approach, these effects will be considered within the interview 
questions.  This will be done in an exploratory manner, with the purpose of supporting the 
                                                 
16
 The term ‘Staff’ will be used indistinctly in this research to refer generally to all levels of the organization’s 
employees, including field staff. The term Managers will refer to mid- and higher levels of management staff. The 
term Field Staff will be used only when referring to the personnel working in projects at community level. 
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stated assumption and to get anecdotic data on it. The research will not seek to scientifically 
verify for the effects of community participation on project outcomes. 
 
3.2. OPERATIONALISING KEY RESEARCH CONCEPTS 
In order to assess the questions posed by this research, it is necessary to differentiate 
the various elements that conform the Social Fund Agency’s Organizational and Institutional 
Context. Each of these elements will be analyzed in this section following the different areas 
the research questions and objectives seek to study. 
  
3.2.1. The Organization’s System and Procedures 
The Organizational Systems and Procedures of the Social Fund will be analyzed in 
terms of the agency’s organizational structure, roles, and formal and informal procedures. The 
objective is to analyze in which ways the organizational system is geared towards 
participation. For that, selected key indicators will be identified and assessed: 
• Project Cycle: the design of participation spaces and the instances at which 
community can participate throughout the Social Fund project cycle. 
• Structure: the characteristics of the organization’s structure will be analyzed in 
order to assess its authority and hierarchy style, as well as the mechanisms for 
community to access Social Fund’s officials and Social Fund’s decision-making 
instances.   
• Standardization and Flexibility: The extent to which the procedures are adaptive 
and flexible. This indicator will look at ways by which formal procedures and project 
criteria can be altered to incorporate innovative ideas and suggestions, or to adjust to 
particular project circumstances. 
 
3.2.2. Social Fund Staff 
As noted, the degree of understanding, commitment and motivation that the external 
agency’s staff has towards participatory methods may influence community participation. It is 
relevant to analyze different aspects related to personnel’s knowledge of community issues, 
their influence in the process and the commitment of the organization to motivate and equip its 
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personnel and field staff to implement participation processes. The research will look at these 
aspects:  
• Staff involvement at Community-level: the involvement and roles of middle 
management and field staff at the community level will be assessed. 
• Staff Academic Background and/or Technical Expertise: This indicator aims to 
understand the personnel’s background in relation to participation methodologies and 
community issues. It is assumed that there are two broad categories where the 
educational background of the personnel might fit: a) social disciplines background, 
and b) technical disciplines background. The perception of the staff on the relevance of 
both categories with regards to community participation in projects will be analysed.  
• Training: This indicator will assess the frequency with which staff receives 
training on participatory methodologies, the content of the training, and the 
perceptions of staff on relevance and adequacy of training.  
• Incentives and Motivation: This indicator seeks to understand ways in which the 
organization promotes the staff’s commitment towards participatory project design 
and implementation. Specifically, the research will look at: a) material incentives for 
the personnel to get involved with communities and apply participatory methods 
(travel and mobility allowances for field staff, salaries, and bonuses); and, b) Staff’s 
perception of motivation and commitment towards the organization and community 
participation.  
• Personnel’s Influence on Community Participation: This indicator intends to have 
an insight on the level to which personnel and field staff working at community 
projects can influence priority setting, planning, decision-making and implementation 
processes in Social Fund projects. Although this is a challenging category of analysis, 
it is important to make an attempt at understanding their influence at both a formal and 
informal level.  
 
3.2.3. Institutional Environment 
As noted earlier in this study, the institutional context of a project might influence 
priorities and project implementation. This is caused by either:  a) the need of the organization 
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to interact with donors and different government levels with different development agendas, or 
by b) a direct influence of these actors and institutions over community participation 
processes. This research will focus on the latter, by analyzing two key actors selected on the 
basis of their close links to the community.  
• Local Government: This indicator will attempt to analyze the local 
governments’ (LGs) influence on the Social Fund’s operations that might have an 
effect on community participation process. Furthermore, local governments are at a 
level where they directly interact with communities. It is then relevant to assess the 
effect that these interactions might have on Social Funds projects.  
• Local Indigenous Institutions: The role of local indigenous institutions within 
the Social Funds’ project cycle and community participation processes. 
 
3.2.4. Community Participation 
As noted, in the context of this research, community participation in Social Fund 
projects is defined as the degree of influence and control by the target group over project 
priority setting, design, resource allocation and implementation. For the purpose of this 
research, resource allocation will be considered as contained within the other three categories, 
and not considered as a separate category of analysis17.  
The ‘degree of participation’, as mentioned in the definition above, refers to the levels 
of ‘intensity’ of participation that were described in section 2.1. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
indicators that will be used to assess community participation in the Social Fund projects. 
Participation of the community at the different stages of the project cycle can differ; the 
continuum of levels of intensity ranges from access to information, to opportunity to express 
opinions, to opportunity to take part in decision-making and finally, to opportunities to be part 
of management instances. These levels may refer to a) formal inclusion, when the possibility 
to enter those participation instances is formally recognized; or, b) substantive inclusion, when 
the individuals are able to actively participate within the formal instances.  Furthermore, the 
analysis of these aspects of participation will take into account that levels of inclusion may 
                                                 
17
 Generally, different decisions over resource allocation are made during priority setting, project design and project 
implementation.  
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vary between individuals in the community. The research will control for gender and social 
differences.  
 
Table 3.1 Indicators for Community Participation 
 
 
PROJECT PHASE 
OPPORTUNITIES 
TO 
PARTICIPATE 
Priority Setting  Project Design  Project Implementation 
Access to 
Information 
Community members 
are informed about 
opportunities to 
define their 
development projects 
priorities 
Community members 
are informed about 
the design features of 
the project 
Community members 
are informed about 
the progress in the 
implementation of the 
project 
Express 
opinions 
Community members 
can express their 
preferences for 
development projects 
Community members 
can express their 
preferences for the 
design of the project 
Community members 
can contribute 
suggestions and 
opinions about the 
implementation of the 
project 
Take part in 
decision-
making 
Community members 
can influence the 
election of the 
development project 
Community members 
can influence the 
design of the 
development project 
Community members 
can influence 
decisions about 
project 
implementation 
Take part in 
management 
instances 
Community members 
can decide their 
development priority 
Community members 
design the projects 
themselves.  
Community members 
implement the 
projects themselves.  
(Source: Author) 
 
3.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. Design and Data Analysis 
The case study 
The research intends to study specific aspects of participation in Social Funds based 
on the research objectives and questions posed above. Towards this goal, and given that the 
universe of Social Funds is extensive, the research privileges a case study methodology in 
order to explore the linkages proposed by the research questions. According to some authors 
(Yin, 2003; Baxter and Jack, 2008), the case study methodology can be considered best suited 
when the purpose of the study is to understand processes and to “answer ‘how’ questions” 
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(Baxter and Jack, 2008: 545). This is particularly relevant given the richness and depth of 
information expected from this research. According to these authors,  
[…] Qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates 
exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. 
This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a 
variety of lenses, which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be 
revealed and understood. (Baxter and Jack, 2008) 
 
Although the nature of the case study and the individual characteristics of Social 
Funds might make generalizations difficult, the use of this methodology allows getting an 
insight into deep complex realities that might uncover issues that would be otherwise 
overlooked. In the words of Flyvberg (2006: 220), 
Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. Good narratives 
typically approach the complexities and contradictions of real life. 
Accordingly, such narratives may be difficult or impossible to summarize 
into neat scientific formulae, general propositions, and theories […] To the 
case study researcher, however, a particularly “thick” and hard-to-summarize 
narrative is not a problem. Rather, it is often a sign that the study has 
uncovered a particularly rich problematic. 
 
The Peruvian Social Fund, FONCODES, has been chosen as the case study scenario 
where the fieldwork will be conducted.  FONCODES is one of the largest Social Funds in 
Latin America and its participatory model has been praised by many experts in the region 
(OEA, 2002: 22).  
 
Data Collection 
FONCODES Central Office is located in Lima. The Social Fund also has 26 regional 
offices across the country. The data collection for this study was carried out at the Central 
Office in Lima and at the Abancay Regional Office, located in the Apurimac region18. The 
field research was carried out over a period of seven weeks between October and November 
2007. Five weeks were spent in Lima and the remaining two weeks in the town of Abancay 
and its surroundings19.  
                                                 
18
 Both regions are highlighted in the map of Peru provided in Section 4.1 of this study. 
19
 A more detailed description of the country context and FONCODES’ background will be provided in Chapter 4. 
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The research relies on a qualitative data collection and analysis approach. This 
approach was considered appropriate due to the nature of the variables and indicators in the 
research. The approach allows for collecting perceptions from different actors at various levels 
and for triangulation of the data collected. In this way, it is expected to achieve a greater level 
of depth and detail in the information obtained, which would allow answering the research 
questions in a more comprehensive manner. By dealing with open questions, the interviewees 
will be able to discuss issues that are important to them, thus signalling the degree of relevance 
that certain organizational and institutional issues have for them. The possible limitations of 
the qualitative data collection approach were considered in the research design. However, 
given the nature of the research as well as its scope, it was deemed appropriate to have a 
smaller sample and less aggregation of data, while privileging richness of anecdotic data.  
The research uses primary and secondary data. Primary data has been collected from 
several sources such as semi-structured and open interviews, group discussions, programme 
documents and observation. Secondary data is quantitative in nature and has been obtained 
from two evaluations of FONCODES. The first evaluation is a cross-country study of six 
social funds, in which special indicators were set for community participation (Rawlings et 
al., 2004). The second one is a statistical study of community participation in FONCODES 
using data from an impact evaluation of the organization (Alcazar and Wachtenheim, 2002).  
Semi-structured interviews with FONCODES personnel and community members 
were conducted. A total of 20 members of the personnel were interviewed at the organization, 
in interviews that lasted 35 minutes in average. Of these, 10 were managers at the central 
office in Lima, 4 were managers at the Abancay regional office and 6 were external agents at 
the same office. Abancay office has 4 mid-level managers and 1 regional manager. Only one 
line manager was not interviewed at the regional office since his role was out of the scope of 
this study. At the community level, there were important limitations to the research that will be 
detailed in the following sub-section. Thus, only 4 semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
Additionally, one informal, open discussion was held with a group of 5 women from one of 
the communities. 
The interviewees were selected through non-probability sampling. Accidental and 
Snowballing techniques were combined for the selection of FONCODES staff and 
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community members for interviews. These sampling techniques were considered adequate, 
taking into account their potential limitations, given the logistic limitations faced in carrying 
out the field research, especially in interviewing community members (see following sub-
section). Three key informants at FONCODES guided the researcher in contacting staff and 
community members for interviews.  
The semi-structured interviews were based on a series of pre-determined open and 
closed questions (See Annex I). This research tool was also valuable to allow new questions 
during the interviews according to the respondents answer. During the interviews with the 
managers, the researcher intended to assess issues related to FONCODES’ organizational and 
institutional context and their influence on community participation. In addition, the 
interviewees’ views on community participation dynamics were obtained. On the other hand, 
the interviews with community members intended to analyze their views on issues related to 
priority setting, participation in project implementation and design, and community 
contributions. Some questions were included in an attempt to gain an insight on sensitive 
issues such as gender inclusion.  
Also, six un-structured interviews with experts on different topics were conducted in 
order to explore some issues more in-depth. Although the interviewer had defined the general 
lines prior to the interview, the questions were open and developed as a conversation. Experts 
were selected through non-probability, judgement sampling relying both in accidental and 
referred introductions. Interviewees included three local government experts, two experts in 
FONCODES processes at national and local level (one high-level FONCODES manager and 
one outsider) and, lastly, an expert in international organizations (IDB and World Bank). 
Thus, experts’ interviews were held on topics such as project cycle, local government and 
decentralization, and general issues regarding FONCODES functioning and impact. Most of 
the data relevant to the Institutional Environment indicator was obtained through the 
interviews with experts.  
FONCODES operational documents were also analysed. In addition, some processes 
were observed during the time the researcher spent at the Social Fund’s offices in Lima and 
Abancay as well as at some of the community meetings in the Apurimac province.   
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The research was conducted primarily in Spanish, which is the researcher native 
language. Only the open group discussion with women from a community was conducted 
partly in Quechua, a language spoken by indigenous communities in Peru. However, in this 
case, the translator was one of the participants in the discussion and the impact the translation 
on the reported findings is considered minimal.  
 
Data Analysis 
The data collected through these several techniques has been analyzed according to its 
qualitative nature. Data analysis was mostly based on the processes proposed by Seidel (1998) 
and the IPDET Handbook (2007). As Seidel (1998) notices, analyzing qualitative data is 
mostly a “process of noticing, collecting and thinking” that is iterative and progressive as well 
as recursive, where noticing and thinking brings us back to previous parts of the research and 
to a renewed process. For this research, the semi-structured interviews were transcribed and 
then coded under each of the research indicators. The answers to each question were 
compared across all the interviews, which allowed highlighting patterns in the interviews’ 
sample.  The relevant topics and patterns found through this analysis have been used as the 
general lines for most of the findings of this research. This data has been crosschecked with 
the data found through the analysis of FONCODES’ documents and the answers from the 
experts, where appropriate. In addition, some notes on observations made by the researcher 
during the stance in Peru have been added when relevant. The secondary data has mainly been 
used as support for findings under the analysis of community participation and to assess issues 
related to project outcomes and impact. The result is a set of findings that reads as a recounting 
of FONCODES’ complex reality, which is privileged by the chosen case study methodology.  
 
3.3.2. Research Limitations 
The research encountered some limitations on its practical implementation that have 
had consequences for the sampling and the scope of this study. The greatest limitation during 
data collection was the impossibility to spend the desired time at the community level, due to 
logistics and time constraints. Most of the communities in which FONCODES’ projects are 
implemented are very remote. In addition, Peru’s geographical characteristics and, in some 
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cases, the lack of transportation infrastructure, make these communities even less accessible. 
Due to the short period of time spent at the regional level, the researcher had to depend on 
FONCODES managers’ schedule of visits to communities as well as on their transportation 
arrangements. The majority of the visits to the communities were for inauguration ceremonies 
of projects. Due to the nature of these visits, the interviews with community members were 
difficult to plan and schedule. Furthermore, it was not possible to focus the research on two 
specific communities, as initially planned, which would have presented more opportunities for 
comparison and provided greater depth of information. In particular, these limitations greatly 
constrained the collection of data that would have provided evidence towards some of the 
aspects of the variable Community participation in Social Fund Projects. The constraints are 
mainly reflected in the findings that refer to substantive inclusion of communities in social 
fund’s projects.  
Although FONCODES personnel were extremely helpful in making the arrangements 
that ultimately allowed achieving the sample of community members’ interviews, logistics 
prevented that the intended number of interviews was fully completed. On a brighter side, the 
time spent with FONCODES’ managers and community members at the communities 
allowed for observation and some valuable insights. Furthermore, the long distances shared 
with the managers in our way to the communities (and the informal talks) were valuable to 
understand the nature of their job as well as the complex reality of Peru.  
On a separate note, it is also relevant to note here that a research might sometimes be 
affected by the position of the researcher and the context of the study. In this case, the 
researcher had no previous connection with FONCODES or its staff and was only introduced 
to them for the purpose of this study. However, one of the constraints to the research came 
from the researcher being perceived as part of FONCODES by community members and as 
part of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) by FONCODES’ staff. The former 
situation happened due the need to visit the communities together with FONCODES’s 
personnel. The latter situation was more relevant at the Central Office, since the researcher had 
first contacted the IDB office in Peru to gain access to the social fund’s key informants. When 
a research is conducted in a foreign country, having helpful key informants and ‘insider 
privileges’ is probably a great advantage. However, this might turn into a problem when the 
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interviewed individuals feel they have to gear their answers towards the interviewer’s 
interests. However, it is expected that the possible consequences of this problem were reduced 
by the specific clarification of the researcher’s neutrality at each interview conducted.  
Finally, it is important to mention that ethical considerations were taken into account. 
Clearance to interview staff and project participants was obtained from FONCODES. In 
addition, the researcher has kept interviewees and key informants’ personal information 
and opinions strictly confidential and anonymous. For that reason, interviews in the 
present study are coded and do not show any personal form of identification.  
 
This chapter has dealt with the theoretical layout for this research. It has presented the 
research goals and questions and has operationalised the key categories of analysis. 
Furthermore, it has presented a detailed account of the methods used to conduct the research 
on the field and an overview of the main limitations the researcher encountered. The following 
chapter will provide background information on Peru as well as the Social Fund to be 
analyzed, FONCODES. The chapter intends to provide context and situate the research 
findings that will be described in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
47 
 
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
 
4.1. COUNTRY CONTEXT OVERVIEW 
4.1.1. Peru’s Demographic and Development Indicators 
Peru’s diversity is evident in its geography as well as in its population. Located in the 
in the Western coast of South America, its territory covers 1.2 million km2 of plain arid coast, 
high mountains and tropical forests. Peru’s population is multi-ethnic and more than a third of 
its 27 million inhabitants belong to the Amerindian20 ethnic group whereas 40 percent are 
‘mestizos’21. Around 12 percent of Peru’s population speaks Quechua, a pre-colonial language 
(INEI, 1993). More than two-thirds of the population lives in cities (INEI, 2004). 
Peru’s Human Development Index was 0.773 in 2005, placing it in the 87th 
position, as a medium development country. In 2006, an estimated of 53% of the 
population were below the national poverty line (Peru Data and Statistics World Bank 
Website, 2008). However, the poverty is deeper in rural areas of Peru, where 73% were 
considered poor (extreme and non-extreme poverty) in 2004 (INEI, 2004).  
According to the IDB22, in spite of an increase in public social spending over the 
1990s, access to basic services such as drinking water, sanitation and electricity are still 
beyond the reach of many Peruvians, especially in rural areas. National coverage for 
potable water is 74.1 percent, although urban coverage reaches 90.7 percent while rural 
coverage covers less than 60 percent of households (combining households with 
connections and those with access to public taps). As for sanitation, 61.3 percent of the 
total population has access to a sewerage system, but in rural areas the figure falls to 13 
percent. About 22.4 percent of the country’s households do not have electricity, with the 
figure climbing to 56 percent in rural areas.  
Access to health services by the most vulnerable population continues to be 
limited. In 2000, the infant mortality rate was 20 per thousand live births in metropolitan 
Lima, while the figure was nearly 80 per thousand in some rural provinces. In education, 
                                                 
20
 Also called Indigenous People of the Americas, this term is used to refer to native populations living in the 
Americas before the arrival of the Spanish colonizers.  
21
 This term is used to define a person’s mixture of European and Amerindians origins.  
22
 The following data has been obtained from: (IDB, 2002a).  
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although general coverage has risen over the decade, there were still major differences 
between urban and rural areas, especially in school services. In 2000, 94 percent of 
schools in urban areas had drinking water and 89 percent had electricity. However, 46 
percent of schools in rural areas had water and only 16 percent had electricity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 1. Physical Map of Peru. (Source: Panorama Peru). The regions where field 
research was carried out have been highlighted in red by the author. Abancay is the 
capital city of the Apurimac Province.   
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4.1.2. Peru’s Political Context (1990-2008) 
Peru’s political scenario in the early 1990s was characterized by a worsening 
economic situation and mounting political violence. The 1980s economic crisis had left 
the country in a deep recession (Velazco Portocarrero, 2004: 3) and two insurgent 
groups had emerged in the rural areas of Peru, rapidly spreading across the country, 
including Lima (‘Sendero Luminoso’ -Shining Path- and the MRTA- Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement). Although these groups were initially considered as popular 
movements, they lost most of the early support they had from peasants and rural 
population as their practices became more violent. The government launched a 
counteroffensive against these groups, which contributed to an increase in violence, as 
paramilitary groups emerged.  The “dirty war” between Sendero Luminoso, the MRTA, 
paramilitary groups and the Armed Forces resulted in around 30,000 dead, mainly in the 
rural areas (Velazco Portocarrero, 2004: 4). The most affected regions were in the 
central and south high Andes, specially Ayacucho, Junín, Huancavelica, Apurimac, 
Puno, Pasco and the capital, Lima (Velazco Portocarrero, 2004: 5).  
Confronted with this economic and political scenario, the newly elected 
government of Alberto Fujimori decided to apply a more aggressive approach. In 1992, 
Fujimori suspended the Constitution, dissolved the congress and arrested the opposition 
leaders as well as the Supreme Court members (Taylor, 2007: 7). The insurgency leaders 
were captured 1992 after a violent counteroffensive, thus putting an end to one of the 
darkest periods in the history of rural communities in Peru. In the following years, he 
proceeded to build a ‘neo-populist’ or ‘militarized’ democracy, characterized by 
presidentialism and a greater role for the armed forces (Taylor, 2007: 7). FONCODES 
was created early during Fujimori’s administration and it was aimed to palliate the 
negative effects of the structural adjustment programs implemented by the country. The 
Social Fund was an instrument for the government to reach the rural areas that were 
hardly hit by the violence.  
Fujimori resigned the presidency in 2000, after his government had been 
discredited by a high degree of corruption. After a one-year transition government, 
Alejandro Toledo narrowly won the presidential elections in 2001. He ran a highly 
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unpopular administration until 2006, when Alan Garcia was elected president. The 
legacy of Toledo showed a steadily growing economy and good macro-economic 
indicators. However, it seems that this economic progress did not translate into benefits 
for the poorest sectors of the Peruvian society (La Nacion, 2006). Nevertheless, an 
important legacy of Toledo’s administration was to kick-start the decentralization 
process in 2001.  
 
4.1.3.The decentralization process 
Peru has been a centralized country throughout most of its history, with Lima 
holding one-third of the country’s population and controlling half of the economic input 
(Forero, 2002). In the 1990s, this trend was further consolidated by the concentration of 
power in the hands of the national government.  
The decentralization process initiated in 2001 created entirely new regional 
administrations23 and transferred new functions and responsibilities to them and the local 
governments in education, health services and other social areas (Felicio and John-
Abraham, 2004: 1). In addition, the decentralization law mandated the use of 
participatory budgeting and planning at the local and regional levels. By 2003, 40 
percent of the regions had completed participatory budgets and had included local 
governments and civil society organizations in their planning (Felicio and John-
Abraham, 2004: 2).  
Some have argued that the decentralization process has not moved at the desired 
pace and that the national government has sought to obstruct its development (Chirinos, 
n.a.). However, “in spite of the difficulties and resistance […] the participatory budget 
and concerted development plans mechanisms have taken the necessary steps towards 
legitimacy” (Chirinos, n.a.).  
 
4.2. FONCODES’ BACKGROUND 
4.2.1. An Overview of FONCODES’ History  
                                                 
23
 Peru's territory is now divided into 25 regions. These regions are subdivided into provinces, which are in turn 
divided into districts. There are 195 provinces and 1833 districts in Peru (INEI, 2002). Each province and district has 
its own municipality, that is, there are two levels of local government level: Provincial Municipalities and District 
Municipalities. 
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FONCODES was created in 1991 by the Fujimori government under the name of 
‘Fondo de Compensación y Desarrollo Social’ (Social Development and Compensation 
Fund). It was established as a decentralized public institution (DPI), and provided with 
technical, administrative, economic and fiscal autonomy. It was part of the Ministry of 
the Presidency from 1992 until 2002, when it was relocated as one of the DPIs of the 
newly created Ministry of Women and Social Development (MIMDES) (FONCODES, 
2001). The Program was initially financed by the national government, with no financial 
input from international donors until 1993.  
FONCODES was created in an attempt to lessen the impact of the 
macroeconomic stabilization program on the poorest sectors of the population. At the 
time of creation, it was thought to be good option to palliate the effects of the limited 
institutional capacity of the ministries to implement such programs and an effective tool 
to reach the most remote rural areas that were out of the scope of the state (FONCODES, 
2001: n.a.).  
FONCODES’ basic objectives were: a) to be an instrument to provide fast and 
effective response to poor sectors, the most affected by the adjustment program; and, b) 
once the macroeconomic stabilization was achieved, FONCODES should support the 
socio-economic development of the poorest sectors of the social strata and economic 
development, especially in rural communities (IDB, 2002b: 10). One of FONCODES’ 
most innovative characteristics was the use of a demand-driven approach to achieve its 
objectives, leaving the priority setting of its projects in the hands of local communities.  
FONCODES was first funded by international donors in 1993, when the IDB and 
the World Bank granted loans for US$100 million each to help finance FONCODES I, 
which had a total cost of US$495 million. The Peruvian government financed the 
remainder US$295 million. FONCODES I was mainly concerned with providing social 
assistance and basic social infrastructure to rural and marginal urban communities. Some 
economic infrastructure projects, such as basic local roads and small irrigation works, 
were financed (IDB, 2002a: 14). 
FONCODES II, approved in May 1996, had a total cost of US$430 million and 
was co-financed by the two Banks, each contributing US$150 million. The funds were 
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used to finance about 15,500 projects. According to program documents, this stage 
sought to consolidate community participation throughout the project cycle, strengthen 
the gender approach, and promote community participation in maintaining the works 
(IDB, 2002a: 14). The sphere of action was limited to remote rural areas (villages with 
between 40 and 400 families). During this stage, 23 regional offices were established 
with the authority to process and approve projects. 
From 1991 to 2001, FONCODES spent around U$S1.5 billion on around 40.000 
small projects, reaching 99% of the districts considered in poverty (IDB, 2002a: 14).  
The IDB and World Bank contributed a total of US$ 500 millions to these operations.  
FONCODES III is the current stage of the Program, which was funded by the 
IDB and the Peruvian government in 2001. The IDB contributed US$150.0 million out 
of a total project cost of US$187.5 million. FONCODES III was designed by paying 
special attention to the initial objective of supporting the social and economic 
development of poorest sectors in the country, especially in rural communities. This 
stage was scheduled to finish in 200824.  
New financing had not been pledged as FONCODES was, at the time of 
research, facing the possibility of being closed-down. In spite of several reforms, many 
consider FONCODES as a Fujimori-era institution. The institution’s claimed autonomy 
and independence have not been sufficient to convince the subsequent administrations 
into keeping the program within government lines. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
drastic reduction of national funds in the third stage of the program. The implications of 
the program extinction for the purpose of this study will be further analyzed within the 
research findings and conclusions.  
 
4.2.2. Impact of FONCODES II  
According to program documents, five evaluations were performed during 
FONCODES II. The main results of these evaluations are discussed below according to 
their outline in the IDB Loan Proposal25.  
                                                 
24
 Field research for this study was carried out in October 2007.  
25
 The data for this section is cited from IDB, 2002a. 
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a) Targeting: two-thirds of the total investment benefited poor or extremely 
poor communities with just 3 percent going to non-poor communities. Another 
study by Paxson and Shady (2002) determined that the focalization of 
FONCODES was better than that of other social programs in Peru, while 
Goodman et al. considered it to be among the best in Latin America (IDB, 
2002a: 17). 
b) Impact on Education: Compared with a control group, there was an 
increase of one classroom per school, enrolment increased by 34 students per 
school and the retention rate showed an average increase of 0.08 years of 
schooling. The number of schools with drinking water grew by 35 percent. 
c) Impact on Drinking Water: In communities that received FONCODES 
assistance, diarrhoea in children 10 years of age and under has fallen by 2.8 
percent and severe diarrhoea by 1.7 percent, both being highly significant. 
Mortality among children five and under fell by 2.4 percent, being also 
econometrically significant. The water collection time fell by 66 percent in cases 
where household connections were installed and by 59 percent for families using 
public taps.  
d) Impact on Sanitation: Sewerage projects did not show significant results 
and no relevant changes were detected in the incidence of diarrhoea or mortality. 
According to the evaluations, the main reason for this low impact is probably 
that the projects did not include the provision of connections; and, due to their 
high cost, over half of the families have not connected to the system. 
e) Impact of Economic Infrastructure: Irrigation and Roads. In irrigation 
projects, arable land increased by an average of 33 percent and production per 
hectare increased between 7 and 50 percent, depending on the crop. As for roads, 
the beneficiary communities began to have access to public transport two or 
three times a week, which presumably has allowed them to connect more easily 
to local markets and to obtain other basic services. 
f) Sustainability: Problems with sustainability have not been observed in 
schools or health facilities, since the ministries have taken up this responsibility 
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after project completion. However, there were sustainability problems with the 
water and sewerage systems: 7 percent of the water systems and 6 percent of the 
sewerage systems were not working. An additional problem was the lack of 
funds for project maintenance since half the communities did not have funds to 
devote to operation and maintenance. 
 
4.2.3. FONCODES III: Objectives and Structure 
FONCODES III is the stage of the program this research has focused on. 
According to program documents, the main objective of the program is to “help improve 
the quality of life and promote socioeconomic development in the country’s poorest 
rural communities” (IDB, 2002b: 10). The specific stated objectives are: “i) increase 
access by the poorest groups to basic social and economic infrastructure services; (ii) 
build capacity to permit poor families to raise their income; (iii) include participation by 
local governments in the project cycle; and (iv) strengthen the positioning of 
FONCODES in the government’s social, poverty-alleviation and State modernization 
plans” (IDB, 2002b: 10).  
The program expects to achieve these goals through three main components 
(IDB, 2002b: 10): 
a) Investment: This component includes three sub-components, namely, 
basic social and economic infrastructure projects, consolidation of productive 
projects and rehabilitation of existing works. 
b) Training and Institution Building: This component includes training and 
strengthening of community management, institutional strengthening and 
equipment for FONCODES and training in social management26.  
c) Follow-up, evaluation and auditing. 
The Investment component planned to finance around 4,325 small projects for an 
amount of US$ 173 million. Of this, US$115 million were directed towards basic social 
and economic infrastructure projects, the sub-component on which this research has 
been focused. Within this sub-component, FONCODES finances the projects that are 
                                                 
26
 The training component will be analyzed more in-depth within the relevant indicators in the following chapter. 
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implemented by the community as well as the costs of community training. Projects 
financed include: rehabilitation or construction of educational infrastructure (Education), 
primary health posts (Health), potable water systems (Water), basic roads (Roads), and 
irrigation and access to markets (Economic Infrastructure). Additionally, projects in the 
areas of Sanitation and Electrification are also financed. Projects on each type of 
investment follow a specific set of guideline and eligibility criteria. These guidelines are 
contained in the Operations Guidelines, which also establish the roles and functions of 
the different actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 2 FONCODES Organizational Chart (Source: MIMDES. Adapted by the 
Author) 
A five-person board of directors appointed by the President of Peru sits atop 
FONCODES’ organizational structure. This board defines institutional policies and 
strategies and supervises the general operations of the organization. One of its members 
acts as FONCODES Executive Director, who is at the same time the Social Fund’s legal 
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representative. The organization’s structure includes seven management offices and 
fourteen sub-management offices that report to the Executive Director. 
FONCODES has also a decentralized structure composed of 26 regional offices 
(ROs). Each of these offices is headed by a Regional Manager, who supervises the work 
of three main regional managers: the Evaluation Manager, Supervision Manager, and 
Promotion and Training Manager.  
The next chapter will present the findings from the data collected during field 
research in Peru.  
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1. ASSESSING THE SOCIAL FUND ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
As noted elsewhere, this research set out to assess the role the organizational 
system and institutional context of the implementation agency play in community participation 
processes in Social Fund projects. The evidence shows that some characteristics of the 
organizational and institutional context might have an impact on community 
participation processes. However, the results are not straightforward. The evidence from 
the Organizational Systems and Procedures’ indicators shows that the project cycle is 
highly geared to the formal inclusion of the community; and that communication 
channels between communities and the Social Fund seem to work relatively well. The 
procedures seem to be flexible, allowing to adapt the projects to the characteristics of the 
community.  
The data obtained for the Social Fund Staff sub-variable seem to indicate that 
technical personnel tend to have more problems when facilitating projects at community 
level than personnel with a background on social disciplines. The evidence also suggests 
that no training on participation models has been consistently offered by the Social Fund 
to mitigate this effect. In addition, although personnel have tended to be motivated to 
apply participatory processes, the Social Fund does not offer incentives for field staff to 
get more involved with communities. Lastly, evidence was found that supports the 
notion that field staff has some influence on community participation process. If this is 
indeed so, the problems with personnel and field staff’s qualification, training, and 
incentives might compromise the quality of participatory processes in the community.  
Regarding FONCODES’ Institutional Environment, the research found that the 
role local governments have recently taken up within the Social Fund’s projects has an 
impact on priority setting by the community as well as on project targeting. In addition, 
local indigenous organizations might be used as channels to legitimate the intervention 
of the Social Fund in the community. These findings will be described in-depth in the 
following sections. Evidence to support them will be provided and brief concluding 
remarks will be given on each of them.  
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5.1.1. The Organization’s System and Procedures 
Project Cycle 
FONCODES project cycle has been analysed based on programme documents 
and can be divided into four broad phases: Pre-Cycle, Pre-Investment, Project Design 
and Project Implementation. Table 5.1 illustrates the several stages included at each 
phase, as well as the role of the community in each of them. Furthermore, the table 
details the activities that FONCODES agents27 on the field have to carry out at the 
different phases as described below.  
• Pre-Cycle 
This stage involves the District and Local Targeting steps. District Targeting is 
done through poverty maps. The poverty map is a tool to identify variable degrees of 
poverty among districts, thus helping to focalize FONCODES’ activities on the poorest 
locations28.   
Local Targeting aims to identify the specific communities where FONCODES 
will work. After the decentralization process was initiated, the Local Government (LG) 
increased its participation at this stage and the demands of the communities are now 
collected in a Local Development Plan (LDP) and included in participatory budgeting. 
Local Governments have the primary responsibility for identifying the locations where 
FONCODES projects will take place.29 
• Pre-Investment 
The steps within this phase are many and aim at assessing project feasibility and 
community mobilization. A Project Promoter – Promotor, in Spanish- is in charge of 
initiating the project at community level by informing the community members on 
project issues and facilitating the process for electing a community Representatives 
Committee (RC). Within FONCODES projects, the entire community is considered as 
the Implementing Group (IG). The Representatives Committee is the body that 
                                                 
27
 The term Agents refers to the facilitators involved directly with the project. There are six types of Agents with 
different roles: a Project Promoter, a Proyectista (Project Designer), Evaluador (Project Appraiser), a Resident 
Expert, a Project Supervisor and a Capacitador Social (Social Trainer).  
28
 The targeted districts should be within the three poorest quintiles identified by the poverty map.  
29
 FONCODES initial project cycle utilized self-targeting (by having the communities submitting project proposals). 
At a later stage this method was changed to a type of local targeting done by FONCODES in collaboration with a 
coordination board formed by local governments, community authorities and civil society organizations.   
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represents the Implementing Group or community30, and, together with FONCODES’ 
agents, is responsible for project issues. 
The Feasibility Assessment consists of two different stages. First, a Proyectista 
(‘Project Designer’, in Spanish) visits the community in order to assess the technical, 
social and environmental feasibility of the project. This agent must rely on asking 
community members (especially the members of the RC) and observing the situation in 
the location to carry out the feasibility assessment. The Proyectista has also to evaluate 
alternatives and choose the option with the smaller cost, taken into account the 
characteristics of the community. During the second stage of the feasibility assessment, 
an Evaluador (similar to ‘Project Appraiser’ in Spanish)31 reviews the design chosen by 
the Proyectista. The Evaluador has to base the review on the social and technical issues 
observed at the local level. 
• Project Design 
The Proyectista prepares the Technical Profile based on a follow-up visit to the 
community. The Evaluador then reviews the Technical Profile as detailed in Table 5.1. 
After this agent’s approval, the Technical Profile is assessed by a manager at the 
Regional Office (RO) and finally approved.  
• Project Implementation 
The Representatives Committee (RC), FONCODES and the Resident Expert 
(equivalent to a ‘project manager’) sign a Funding Agreement for the Project 
Implementation phase. The Resident Expert agent is responsible for the project 
execution together with the RC. Thus, the community executes the project with the 
Resident Expert’s technical guidance. A Project Supervisor has the role of overseeing 
implementation progress as well as any problem that may arise during this stage. A 
Capacitador Social (‘Social Trainer’ in Spanish) provides community training at this 
stage. After the project is completed, the infrastructure is transferred to the appropriate 
ministry or government level for its maintenance.  
                                                 
30
 The RC is formed by four members: a President, a Secretary, a Treasurer and an Overseer. The Overseer is a 
municipal employee designated by the local government. The functioning and roles of this committee are explained 
under the community participation variable in Section 5.2. 
31
 This term is used in this research as an equivalent to Evaluador in Spanish which is the term used by FONCODES 
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Table 5.1 FONCODES Project Cycle (Source: Author) 
 
Project Cycle 
Phase Pahse Steps FONCODES involvement Community Involvement 
A. Pre-Cycle 
1. District Targeting Targeting according to Poverty Map n.a. 
2. Local Targeting Community Targeting according to LDP Community brings its priority to the local government and 
negotiates its inclusion in LDP 
B. Pre-Investment 
1. Promotion Promoter informs community about conditions for financing and 
assists them in electing a RC and elaboration of Funding Request 
Community is informed about the project, selects its 
Representatives Committee and elaborates priority and 
Funding Request 
2. Funding Request n.a. RC submits Funding Request to RO 
3. RO Prioritization Regional Office ranks the project within its portfolio n.a. 
4. First Funding 
Agreement RC and RO sign the Agreement to carry out feasibility assessment and project design 
5. Feasibility Study 
Besides other technical issues, Proyectista verifies that project is a 
priority for the community, that the RC is legitimate and that there 
are no conflicts in the community. A project alternative is selected. 
Community members express their opinions to the 
Proyectista on project priorities and needs.  They are 
informed about the documents they must submit. 
6. Feasibility Study 
Review 
Evaluador reviews the assessment made by Proyectista. He also 
verifies that the community is informed about FONCODES’ 
projects requirements, that they accept the selected alternative and 
are committed to participate at training sessions and community 
contributions.  
Community members are informed and consulted on the 
selected alternative. They have to commit to attend training 
sessions and to contribute to the project. 
C. Project Design 
1. Technical Profile 
Design  
Proyectista designs the project technical profile, ensuring that 
community participates on the fieldwork for the design, and 
provides information on project design to community.  
Community participates in the information-gathering stage. 
The RC provides the necessary documents to the 
Proyectista. 
2. Technical Profile 
Review  
Evaluador assesses technical profile, and the motivation and 
commitment of the community.  
The RC is informed about the following stages of the 
process. 
3. Project Approval RO assesses the Inspector report and approves the project.  n.a. 
D. Project 
Implementation 
1. Funding Agreement RC and RO sign the Agreement to finance the project 
2. Project Execution 
Resident Expert (RE) is responsible together with RC of the 
execution of the project. Supervisor assesses the progress of the 
project and RE and RC’s activities.  
The RC keeps the community informed of project progress 
and funds disbursement. Community contributions are 
implemented 
3. Community Training Capacitador Social organizes training sessions during project 
execution. They have to organize at least three sessions.  Community members attend training sessions.  
4. Project Completion 
and Transference 
Once the project is finalized, it is transferred to the corresponding ministry or government body. 
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In general, the project cycle reflects the spaces for formal inclusion of 
communities within the Social Fund. It is possible to observe that, in FONCODES, the 
project cycle is geared towards community involvement in a way that matches the 
project cycle proposed by the theory32. However, the participation of the community 
seems to decrease greatly on project design, which might have negative consequences 
for project ownership and sustainability. Formal inclusion of the community in the 
project cycle will be analyzed more in-depth under the community participation 
indicator of this research33.   
 
Organizational Structure 
By assessing FONCODES structure, this study aimed at understanding the 
organization’s level of decentralization, hierarchy and mechanisms for community 
access to the Social Fund. The main sources for analysing the social fund’s structure 
were programme documents and interviews with managers and experts.  
FONCODES has 26 Regional Offices (ROs) across the country and they have 
decision-making power over project approval and funds disbursement. Some of the 
interviewees considered that the RO’s autonomy make them more efficient than many 
other public institutions. They also argued that the regional offices contribute to 
legitimize FONCODES at the regional and local level.  
When FONCODES started operating, it was a centralized agency that depended 
directly from the President’s office and it was seen as a way for the Executive to reach 
the most remote areas directly. In practice, however, this meant that the local 
governments were bypassed by the centralized social fund agency, without being able to 
provide services (given their limited resources) or to obtain technical assistance from the 
national government. In addition, the social fund was a distant organization in Peru’s 
capital that was hard for communities to reach. The research findings suggest that 
Regional Offices and a decentralized structure may contribute to engage FONCODES at 
the regional level with local authorities and communities, and thus, help legitimize the 
social fund’s role in their eyes, as well as in front of the public opinion and international 
                                                 
32
 See Chapter 1. 
33
 See Section 5.1.4 of this study 
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donors. Thus, as it is explained in more detail below in this chapter, regional offices 
would not only be a mechanism available for communities to reach the social fund 
directly but also would engage local governments in service delivery and provide them 
with capacity-building at the local level.  
As one manager indicated,  
I believe that the central office is an information centre to channel resources 
through FONCODES. The utilization of regional offices is essential because 
they represent the legitimization of FONCODES in the region. The 
beneficiaries can turn to the regional office to introduce their demands (SI-
LI-01).  
 
In general, the interviewed staff considered that FONCODES decentralized 
structure was appropriate. Communication channels between the central and regional 
offices seem to work well, and managers from the central office carry out monthly visits 
to the regional offices. One manager mentioned: “We are in permanent and fluid 
communication with the regional office” (SI-LI-07). 
Due to the characteristics of their selection and hiring process, the external 
agents at FONCODES projects are accountable to both the regional office and the 
community’s Representatives Committee. The regional office selects the agents based 
on criteria that assigns credits to their qualifications and ranks them in a priority list. 
Then, the community’s Representatives Committee for the project hires the external 
agents. The Representatives Committee pays for the agents’ services from pre-assigned 
project funds and has, accordingly, ‘employer’ rights. During the project cycle, the 
external agents are in constant communication with the regional office, to which they 
provide updates on the project. 
In general, it was observed that external agents have a close relation with the 
regional office. During the researcher’s stance in the Abancay office, it was observed 
that the agents reported to the office constantly and met with top and mid managers. The 
agents confirmed that the communication between them and the regional office was 
constant and efficient, which contributed towards the support role the office has in the 
field for these agents. One of the interviewed agents explained,  
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Our communication with the regional office is excellent. We are pleased 
with the managers’ attention and support to our problems at community 
level. The Regional Office has always tried to raise the professional quality 
standards. We have a tight coordination with the office (SI-EA-02).  
 
Little evidence was collected on the hierarchical relation between communities 
and the agents. Some of the managers interviewed at the regional office mentioned that 
the communities are sometimes afraid of demanding the fulfilment of the contract 
requirements by the agents. When conflicts arise, the community members would not 
make their complaints public because of fear of losing the funds for the project. 
According to one of the managers, “the Representatives Committee sometimes avoids 
complaining about the agents’ lack of attendance [to the project site] because they fear 
that the project will be stopped or the funds will have to be returned” (SI-AB-01). 
However, no evidence from the community members was obtained on this issue.  
The communication channels between the community and FONCODES’ 
structure were also analyzed. In this regard, there is an established mechanism through 
which the claims or suggestions made by the community can reach FONCODES. The 
first and closest instance for the community to make claims or suggestions is the 
Resident Expert. If the community does not find a solution at this instance, they can turn 
to the Project Supervisor, and after that to the Regional Office managers. Normally, the 
Regional Office has the biggest discretional power on project issues. However, it is also 
possible for the community to take its problems to FONCODES’ Central Office in Lima, 
and even to their political representative instance at the national level. When the 
personnel were asked about the functioning of this mechanism, they reported that the 
community constantly utilizes it to channel their problems to Social Fund’s officials. 
Their problems normally find solution at the Regional Office level. However, sometimes 
community members travel to the central office to bring these problems to the table (SI-
LI-06).  
During the researcher’s stance in Lima, it was observed that a group of 
representatives from communities and municipalities from Arequipa (a region 1030 km 
South of Lima) had come to the office to complain about a problem with funds 
disbursement. They had exhausted the claims’ instances at local and regional level, and 
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thus, had decided to come to the Central Office in Lima to have their voices heard. They 
were received by FONCODES’ Executive Director. When the researcher consulted 
them, they did not seem to blame FONCODES about the delay on the disbursement of 
the funds, but attributed it to a problem with the international donors. They had worked 
with FONCODES in many projects and were satisfied with their experience and the 
outcomes of the projects.  
At the regional office level, it was also observed by the researcher that 
community members (especially the Representatives Committee) frequently visited the 
office. The reasons for these visits seem to be related to signing documents and 
attending some training workshops. However, it was also observed that they could meet 
with regional managers at all levels to discuss issues related to project implementation.    
At the community level, the Representatives Committee members that were 
interviewed said that they had frequent opportunities to talk to the agents. At one of the 
projects, they seemed confident they could express their views to the agents, either at 
public meetings or at the RC meetings. When asked about this issue by the researcher, 
one Representatives Committee (RC) member stated: “We (the RC) talk to the Resident 
Expert quite a lot. And [this agent] talks to the Supervisor, who then takes our problems 
to FONCODES”.  
In general, FONCODES’ structure is decentralized and the roles, responsibilities 
and decision-making power are highly distributed along the organization. The middle-
line at the central and regional level seems to hold great level of discretionary power and 
freedom of action. A question for further research lies on the hierarchy between 
communities and agents, as evidence of some conflicts was found. Finally, the 
communities seem to have channels to access FONCODES officials and decision-
making spaces. They seem to utilize those channels to introduce their demands or 
claims, as well as to access information on project issues.   
 
Standardization and Flexibility 
As noted in the theoretical discussion in previous chapters, it is possible for 
bureaucratic tendencies to standardize and impose top-down targets to become 
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impediments for organizations to adopt participatory methodologies. On the contrary, it 
is more likely that flexible and adaptive norms and procedures enhance the effectiveness 
of the organization for implementing participatory processes. Rigid system pressures 
might affect the job of managers and facilitators by diverting their attention to 
bureaucratic goals instead of prioritizing participatory processes. These processes were 
analysed based on FONCODES’ operational documents and interviews with managers, 
agents and experts.  
It is important to note that FONCODES norms and procedures have been 
reformed several times over the past 16 years. According to the interviewees, these 
changes reflect the learning process the organization has gone through during its life. 
However, one of the consequences is that the level of standardization of procedures at 
the organization is high. This becomes clear by looking at the organization’s operational 
regulations, where each step in the project process is systematically detailed. Every 
activity that agents ought to carry out is carefully described and the agents must attach 
several documents to each submission. 
Some elements that might tend to make processes more inflexible were observed 
at the level of operational procedures and project criteria. Thus, some of the 
requirements for project eligibility, appraisal or execution could become a barrier for 
project targeting and community participation. In this line, the project eligibility criteria 
states that projects must fall within the investment lines of FONCODES, which can be 
seen as an impediment to target the real needs or priorities of the community. Another 
eligibility criterion requires that the targeted community must have between 40 and 700 
families. This could mean that a 39-families community be ruled out from the benefits of 
the project, even after it has been selected as a priority area of intervention by the local 
government or FONCODES. Another example of norms that might affect project 
targeting can be found in the cost-benefit appraisal criteria that the project approval 
depends on. Without taking into account community needs or cultural and local 
characteristics, this can be a serious factor hindering the preference targeting of the 
community.  
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It was then important to look at the relevance of these seemingly negative 
elements in the implementation of FONCODES projects. Interviewees were asked how 
flexible they considered the organization was and then asked about the specific criteria 
mentioned above. A majority agreed that, in general, the procedures are flexible and can 
be altered to take into account specific situations or characteristics of the community. 
Most of them said that the procedures could be changed with the approval of the central 
office, if the changes were duly justified. However, at the regional level, it was 
mentioned that sometimes it is necessary to change things during the project cycle that 
cannot wait for the central office’s approval. One of the managers said: “Sometimes we 
can not follow all the rules. There are informal processes inside the office that permit to 
by-pass them. The changes are formalized later. Sometimes we cannot wait for a 
response; we have to take the risks and move forward” (SI-AB-02). Although the 
manager expressed the possibility of bypassing the procedures at exceptional situations, 
he made clear that they risked being sanctioned by doing that. This comment suggests 
that the level of bureaucracy might affect project efficiency. However, this situation 
should be evaluated vis-à-vis issues of transparency and control to obtain a more 
comprehensive idea of it.  
In general, FONCODES’ personnel mentioned that there were some procedures 
or rules that could be changed whereas others were ‘non-negotiable’. Thus, there is 
flexibility for altering projects where the prioritization is wrong, proven that the priority 
set is in conflict with the community’s wishes or needs. Furthermore, the requirement 
for a minimum or a maximum of families mentioned above was not considered a strict 
requirement, as long as the benefit to the community justified funding the project. 
Managers also pointed out that sometimes the projects need to be adapted to diverse 
realities across different geographic areas, which implies minor changes in the 
procedures. More importantly, it was understood that when the project privileges local 
non-qualified labour or in-kind community contributions, the project execution might 
take longer than it would take with experienced labour. However, the use of local labour 
for its execution would be privileged over strict timelines. According to one of the 
managers,  
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[The norms and procedures] are totally flexible and they have been done in 
this way based on FONCODES experience. It is very difficult to set 
homogeneous rules that can be applied to communities in the country’s coast 
and to communities in the mountains. They have different perspectives on 
community work. […] We also have to be flexible about the performance of 
communities. We may take one or two months longer to complete a project 
that [the community members] have been waiting for ten or twenty years.  I 
think that a short delay is well worth the price of having their participation in 
the project (SI-LI-07). 
 
On the other hand, among the norms and procedures that were ‘non-negotiable’, 
staff mentioned the requirement for a minimum of participants in community meetings 
or workshops. In addition, FONCODES cannot intervene in a community where social 
conflicts are observed. Lastly, the project proposed by the community has to fall within 
one of the program lines of investments. One interviewee pointed out that,  
There have been specific cases where we could not intervene because there 
were conflicts in the community. Also, we can only work with communities 
whose priorities fit our investment lines. The project cycle and the 
procedures have greatly changed since the creation of FONCODES. This 
was intended to improve the projects, to which it has indeed contributed a 
lot. (SI-LI-02) 
 
In general, managers agree that the system is flexible and that contributes 
positively to project outcomes, as the projects can be adapted to specific situations or 
characteristics of the community. Their opinion was that those elements that were not 
flexible also helped to keep the projects manageable.  
Based on the staff’s comments, it seems that FONCODES’ system is balanced 
between some procedures that are flexible and others that are not. This seems to help in 
keeping the projects systematized while at the same time considering particularities of 
the community or the project. Some evidence was found that community participation 
might be privileged over strict timelines, for instance, in the issue of community 
contributions. However, these comments were not assessed from the community 
members’ perspective and further evidence would be necessary on that matter.  
 
5.1.2. Social Fund Staff 
Staff Involvement at Community Level 
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This section will give an introduction to the analysis of the Social Fund staff 
characteristics and will assess the structure of FONCODES personnel in relation to their 
work at community level. Information on this indicator has been analysed from 
FONCODES’ documents and from interviews with managers, agents and experts.  
As noted, FONCODES external agents are the main project facilitators at 
community level34. In addition, a great majority of management personnel at 
FONCODES central and regional offices are in constant interaction with projects at the 
community level. The central level managers often visit Regional Offices and monitor 
projects in the community. Regional managers, it was observed, are constantly visiting 
and supervising community projects. For the purpose of this research, Field Staff will 
refer here to all the staff that is in contact with the community on a regular basis. This 
includes mainly external agents and regional managers, and central level management 
when specifically working at the community level. 
In 2002, FONCODES had a staff of 294 technicians, with 145 at headquarters 
and 149 at the zone offices (IDB, 2002). This figure does not take into account the 
number of external agents. It is difficult to estimate the number of active external agents 
at any given time. However, the 2006 register of qualified professionals at the Abancay 
Regional Office contained around 500 professionals. This figure refers to Proyectistas, 
Evaluadores, Resident Experts and Project Supervisors35. At the time, the Abancay RO 
had 371 projects at different phases.  
 
Staff’s Academic Background and Technical Expertise 
This indicator aims to assess the relevance of the staff’s background on 
participatory projects implementation. It is based on the argument that facilitators might 
influence these processes and hence, their training on and commitment to participatory 
methods might be relevant to community participation in Social Fund projects36. The 
broad categories that this indicator uses to categorize staff’s backgrounds are a) social 
disciplines background, b) technical disciplines background and c) experience at 
                                                 
34
 For a description of these agents activities see Project Cycle indicator on section 5.1.1. 
35
 No register for Social Trainers was accessed.  
36
 For a discussion on these issues see section 3.3.1 in this study.  
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community level. The findings for this indicator are mainly based on interviews with 
managers and agents as well as programme documents.  
A great majority of FONCODES personnel and field staff have a technical 
background. Out of 14 interviewed managers at central and regional level, two of them 
had a degree in social disciplines, one in Economics and the other one in Education. The 
remaining 12 had a degree in different branches of Engineering or in Architecture. The 
external agents were all Engineers, except for one who had a degree in Education and 
another one who had both a degree in Engineering and in Education. From the register 
of external agents for the RO Abancay, all the listed individuals had a background on 
Engineering or Architecture. However, this register did not include Promotores and 
Capacitadores Sociales, who, in general, have a background in social disciplines and the 
researcher did not have access to a list for those agents.  
The information obtained can be explained by two main factors. First, the nature 
of the projects makes it necessary to have expertise on technical disciplines (most 
projects are for small infrastructure) for the tasks of Proyectista, Evaluador, Resident 
Expert and Supervisor. This does not hold for the Promotores and Capacitadores 
Sociales, who are more often associated with social disciplines. Additionally, the 
guidelines for contracting are clear about the qualifications required for managers and 
external agents. Technical background is mandatory for most of the operational tasks, 
whereas social science background is not mandatory in any case, but preferred for those 
tasks that imply sensitizing, mobilizing or training the community (the Promotor and 
Capacitador, roles which are usually performed by the same person). Although it is 
clear that the nature of the projects requires in most cases professionals from technical 
disciplines, it was relevant to explore if this had any effect in the personnel’s activities at 
the community level.  The interviews sought to obtain the staff’s perception on this 
matter.  
When asked what skills or background they considered to be more relevant in the 
work with the communities, a majority of the interviewees said that it was important to 
have both technical and social disciplines background. A minority singled out social 
skills as the most relevant background.  None mentioned technical skills as the single 
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most important background for working in community projects. This is probably due to 
the fact that the technical knowledge required for the type of infrastructure projects that 
FONCODES executes is relatively simple. As one of the managers noted,  
The type of infrastructure financed by FONCODES does not require a 
specialized technical knowledge. They are small- and medium-sized civil 
works that any engineer is prepared to do. I think it is important to 
strengthen the staff’s social skills… how the professionals first contact the 
community. It would be necessary to strengthen the initial phase so the 
project addresses both [social and technical] issues during its life cycle. (SI-
LI-02)  
 
According to some managers, there were some problems that technical field staff 
would tend to have more often than staff with social background when dealing with 
communities. The single most mentioned problem referred to communication difficulties 
between staff and community members. According to the managers, this could be due to 
the fact that technical staff tends to focus more (or only) on the technical issues of the 
projects. In addition, a few managers mentioned that this type of staff could tend to have 
an authoritarian attitude, or disregard the opinions from the communities because “they 
believe they are the professionals and know best how to do [the project]” (SI-LI-02). As 
one manager at the regional office said, 
As engineers, we only have technical training and, hence, the engineers who 
work at the community level carry out a purely technical work. We haven’t 
been sensitized about social issues. I think in general we do a ‘cold work’; 
the agents go to the community, finish their work and leave. They don’t look 
at the needs of the community (SI-AB-02). 
 
According to the interviewees, the apparent lack of communication between 
technical staff and the community might have an impact on the project. First, the 
community will tend to participate less and therefore will not be willing to fulfil the 
initially agreed community contribution. Furthermore, the community will not be 
sensitized about the importance and maintenance of the project. In consequence, project 
ownership feelings will be low, which in turn will negatively affect project sustainability 
and overall project success. Various managers at central and regional level articulated 
these important claims.   
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When asked about the relevance of the technical background vis-à-vis social 
background, one of the managers said,  
[Communication with the community] contributes to sustainability and 
ownership of the project by the local population. Sometimes the social issues 
[in the community] are disconnected from the technical issues of the project, 
and it is as if each person were speaking a different language. That affects 
people’s participation. Sometimes they do not fulfil their contribution 
commitments because there has not been a good communication between 
them and the agents (SI-LI-08).  
 
Another manager commented, 
If [technical staff] gets more involved with the social issues, they can then 
talk to the community members and learn about their needs and their 
traditions. In addition, they can see if the project being financed is the right 
one. Sometimes [the project prioritization] is wrong but the engineer goes to 
the community and carries out the project as it is stated in the paper; he does 
not evaluate if the prioritization has been correctly done (SI-AB-02).  
 
From a slightly different perspective, one manager recognized the importance of 
‘social skills’ for implementing the projects, but said that the organization’s priority is to 
have technically qualified personnel. He argued that technical staff tends to be more 
efficient at reaching goals whereas the impact of social work is difficult to measure.  
I think FONCODES has always worked towards achieving targets and 
results. The social aspect, albeit important, it is not measurable in the short 
term. There is always a need for having the minimum staff and this leads to 
the organization keeping the people who are more related to the operational 
part (SI-LI-06) 
This comment points out at different ways of measuring efficiency, one that 
focuses purely on measurable results and another one that considers overall project 
outcomes. 
When analyzing the external agents’ responses separately, they show a somewhat 
different perspective.  Most of them hinted that each professional must perform different 
tasks and therefore needs a different academic background or skills set. Thus, the 
background is only relevant depending on the position that the professional has in the 
project. There seemed to be a consensus that technical staff has to do technical tasks, and 
‘social staff’ has to do social activities. Nevertheless, a few agents acknowledged that 
technical staff had to ‘get involved’ with the community too. One of them said that if 
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they received more social training they could coordinate and enhance the work of the 
Social Trainer and the Promoter.  
I think we could all share the responsibility for [providing] training to the 
community, not only the staff that is in charge of the social work. The 
technical agents can have that role, since we have the advantage of spending 
more time in the community during project execution. The Capacitador only 
goes to the community a few times during the project life to facilitate 
specific meetings. Maybe we [the technical staff] can assume part of the 
Capacitador’s role as a complement to our tasks. I do not think it will take 
much of our time (SI-EA-03). 
   
Finally, and although it was not explicitly considered in the initial research 
design, it became evident throughout the interviews that the experience of field staff 
with participatory processes was a relevant variable.  Thus, this issue is analysed here 
based on the importance given to it by interviewees during open questions in the semi-
structured interviews. Further research might be necessary to more fully understand 
these linkages.  
A majority of the managers mentioned that the staff would acquire some of the 
necessary skills when directly interacting with the community. Thus, they tend to 
become more aware and experienced on social issues by the very same work with 
community projects. “We have had problems with the way in which the professionals 
approach the community for the first time. But they have learned during the process and 
have left aside that ‘inherent authoritarian attitude’” (SI-LI-02).  
 However, two of the managers also pointed out that some field staff might not 
be interested in learning new skills to deal with communities. In their opinion, they 
would only focus on the technical elements of the project and would not pay attention to 
social issues.  
One of the problems is that some of the technical professionals that go to the 
community for the first time have problems with the initial contact. 
However, another aspect of this problem is that technical staff does not pay 
attention to social matters. They only focus on the infrastructure part and do 
not look at the social aspects. That leads to problems with the completion of 
the project because there is not a relationship with the community (SI-AB-
03).  
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A majority mentioned that beyond any particular pre-acquired expertise, it is 
more important that personnel and field staff a) know how FONCODES works or b) 
have some personal traits that can help the person in better communicating with the 
community. As a manager at the central office said, 
I believe I am a person with social sensitivity and that people working at 
FONCODES should have [this type of sensitivity]. We do not need all 
engineers or all teachers; we need people who are concerned with social 
issues when they go to the community […] Our projects are not complex 
engineering systems; but we do contribute in a different way, by solving 
social problems. We do not need the best technicians; we need trained 
technical staff that has social sensitivity. Sometimes, this is much more 
important than the technical aspects (SI-LI-03).  
 
The evidence collected under this indicator reveals that, due to the nature of 
FONCODES’ projects, a great majority of the personnel has a technical background. 
This may have some effects on field staff’s relationship with the community. Thus, some 
problems in the way these professional communicate and contact community members 
might have an impact on community participation and contributions towards the project. 
These problems can influence project ownership and sustainability. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be a positive relationship between experience of the field staff at community 
level and an impact on community participation. Further study is required to contrast 
this finding by evaluating the dynamics on the field.  
 
Training 
The design of FONCODES III includes a component for training and capacity 
building37. This component involves three sub-components, namely, training for 
communities, institutional strengthening of FONCODES and training in social 
management. The institutional strengthening of FONCODES refers to training for 
FONCODES’ personnel at headquarters and in the regional offices mainly in the areas 
of the strategic vision of program intervention, national rules on investment projects, 
gender, environment, decentralization, and ethics and institutional integrity. In addition, 
activities that are carried out individually -such as attending special courses- may be 
financed by FONCODES (IDB, 2002: 9). 
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 See Section 4.2.3.  
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The sub-component for training in social management was intended to reach 
professionals and technicians from all levels of government, NGOs, academics and 
others. The courses would stress policy design and good practices in financing, 
organization and management of the delivery of social services. The Inter-American 
Institute for Social Development (INDES) executed this subcomponent (IDB, 2002: 10).   
When asked about whether they had received any training, a slight majority of 
managers at central and regional office said that managers and field staff received 
training. A minority of managers said that they had not received any training or could 
not recall receiving it. A few mentioned that they had obtained some kind of training 
individually at external instances. Some managers had taken part in post-graduate 
courses, which sometimes were financed by FONCODES. Some had enrolled in the 
Social Management course offered by INDES. 
When asked about the content of the training offered by FONCODES, most of 
the staff said that it was mainly related to technical aspects of projects. None of the 
managers at central level recalled having received any training on participatory 
methodologies. Overall, FONCODES seems to have consistently prioritized training in 
technical aspects of the projects over training in social aspects (participation, capacity 
building and others). One manager commented: “I am aware of participation issues, but 
it has not been a priority for the organization to give training on this issue to its 
personnel” (SI-LI-01). 
When analyzed separately, all the external agents stated that they received 
training at monthly workshops organized by the regional office. The topics covered in 
these workshops were mostly related to technical aspects of the project. Five out of six 
interviewed agents confirmed they had not received training on community participation 
issues or participatory methodologies. The remaining agent was a Capacitador, and 
therefore she had received training related to social aspects of projects, such as 
community capacity building and participation.  
At the regional office, one manager said that they have the obligation of offering 
an introductory course to external agents. However, the training in social issues has 
usually had less relevance compared to the importance given to training on technical 
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aspects of the projects. “We do not address social sensitivity issues in depth; we should 
do it. We pay more attention to technical issues because if there are technical problems, 
they can have legal consequences. But social problems do not ‘transcend’” (SI-AB-02). 
This points out to the fact that there are not only no legal consequences to ‘social 
problems’ but also to the fact that social aspects are probably not a measure of efficiency 
for the projects, and hence they would not transcend.  
Another manager at the regional level raised a different perspective. He 
mentioned that the regional office offers training on participation and other social issues, 
but the problem lays in the fact that the external agents do not pay attention to these 
topics. According to him, they have to work these topics only with the Capacitadores. 
The regional office offers training on participation and other social aspects to 
the agents. The problem is that they do not attach importance to it. When we 
schedule a one-day training workshop, many of them just come for half the 
day and leave. The training does not have a relevant effect on them (SI-AB-
03). 
 
The personnel was also asked whether they considered important to have training 
on community participation aspects, to what a majority answered positively. They 
considered that this training could have the effect of generating a greater awareness of 
social aspects on technical personnel. This was considered as especially important for 
the staff that has not worked in the field for a long time, as it would improve their 
project management skills. In turn, this could contribute to generate more participation 
from the community, positively affecting overall project outcomes. One of the managers 
who had taken the course in social management offered by INDES mentioned that it had 
been very relevant to his career and he whished he had had that training earlier in his 
professional career (SI-LI-04). 
[Training on community participation issues] is relevant for all the 
personnel. With this training, the technical staff would learn about social 
aspects and would acquire better management skills. Ultimately this could 
contribute to the final objective, which is an improvement of the local 
people’s lives (SI-LI-02).  
 
A minority of the managers and field staff answered that they did not consider 
this training important for managing the projects at community level. The main reason 
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for this was that the project cycle is already participatory and the very knowledge of the 
functioning of FONCODES projects by managers and field staff would suffice.  
Anyone who works at FONCODES should know about participation, and 
should know that the community meetings are at the core of the projects. 
Even if there is not any training on participatory methodologies, the 
facilitator incorporates the basic notions of community participation by 
learning FONCODES project model (SI-LI-01).  
 
To sum up, on the question of the existence and contents of training, it was clear 
that there had been some opportunities for managers to get training in social aspects of 
the projects, but there has not been a consistent system to offer this opportunity by 
FONCODES. Training in social aspects of the projects and community participation 
issues has not been a priority for the institution. Even if FONCODES project model is 
geared to community involvement, a majority of personnel considered that some training 
on participation issues could contribute to their tasks at the community level.  
 
Incentives and Motivation 
The incentives the Social Fund offers and its staff’s motivation may serve to 
assess the degree of commitment staff has to facilitating participatory projects. The 
material incentives analyzed here focused on those elements that might foster the 
commitment of staff towards getting involved with communities. The motivation issue 
was explored in a more general way and issues related to job stability were assessed.  
The documents reviewed for this research did not make specific mention of any 
kind of incentive or benefit systems for personnel and field staff. At the central office 
level, a majority of the managers mentioned that, when working in the field, they 
received allowances to cover travel expenses. Many of them also mentioned that they 
believed the field staff, especially the agents, received some sort of extra monetary 
reward for working in remote communities. A few considered that such a system had no 
influence on the field staff’s job performance as they worked for FONCODES for other 
non-material rewards. When asked about the influence of incentives on her tasks, one of 
the managers commented: “I do not think it is influenced by economic incentives. It is 
related to being part of this model… being part of FONCODES” (SI-LI-08).  
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However, all the agents interviewed at the regional level confirmed that they did 
not receive any kind of additional benefits or incentives for their tasks. Thus, they do not 
receive per diems or incentives for working in remote locations. The community hires 
them under a contract for non-personal services, which is established for a pre-set 
payment for the agent’s services. That payment takes into account the activities and field 
visits the agent will have to carry out during her/his involvement in the project. They 
also commented that they did not receive any other type of job benefits such as health 
coverage or accident insurance. Initially, many of them stated that this system did not 
affect their motivation towards their job, since they know and accept the conditions of 
the contract beforehand. However, when asked more in-depth about this issue, some of 
them hinted that they had ways to cope with it. Thus, one of the agents mentioned that 
sometimes, if the conditions of the project were too harsh, it would not be possible for 
them to fulfil the entire contract requirements, and sometimes they might make less field 
visits. “We have to set our own conditions to remain in the places we are assigned to. If 
we cannot fulfil all of FONCODES’ requirements, then we will have to meet 75% of 
what the contract requires” (SI-EA-02).  
One of the agents said that her contract would stipulate a certain amount of field 
visits and cover the costs for them. However, sometimes the community’s schedule 
would make it impossible to have the required training hours fulfilled, and new meetings 
would have to be scheduled. She said that she would still go to the meetings because she 
had made a commitment with the community. However, if it were up to her, she would 
not go to those extra meetings she was not being paid for (SI-EA-04). 
When asked what they would change in the incentives and benefits system, the 
majority of the agents mentioned they would like to have insurance and to have an 
allowance for travel expenses.  
When asked whether FONCODES’ personnel were motivated to perform their 
job, a slight majority of the managers interviewed at the central and regional level 
answered positively.  According to them, the main reason for the staff to be motivated 
was to be part of the FONCODES’ model. They considered that FONCODES is a 
legitimate model that works with and directly helps poor communities, thus contributing 
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to the overall development of their country. In this regard, one of the managers 
commented: “My motivation is not only based on material incentives; it is also related to 
the fact that I feel good to do something for my country and to help the poorest people” 
(SI-LI-06). 
Other reasons for motivation were that FONCODES’ staff has a relatively good 
level of salary. “Compared to other government organizations, FONCODES pays good 
salaries to its employees” (SI-LI-01). However, the fact that FONCODES give its 
personnel relatively good salaries was unrelated to the fact that the job stability is 
relatively low. It seems that most of FONCODES’ personnel are hired on a temporary 
basis on a ‘professional services’ category. This means that they act as ‘external 
consultants’ for the organization and their contracts are renewed on a monthly or bi-
monthly basis. At the central level office, the researcher was able to observe that the 
uncertainty attached to this kind of arrangement creates some levels of anxiety on the 
organization’s personnel. One of the managers mentioned,  
In no way are work conditions a factor that influences our motivation. Our 
contracts are renewed each month, and we only get twelve salaries per year. 
We do not have social security. I have been at the organization for seven 
years and have never had a contract for more than two months. Eighty 
percent of the personnel is in this situation. I do not think those conditions 
are a factor for somebody to stay at the organization. There has to be a more 
altruist factor… working for FONCODES is more fulfilling in a personal 
sense than working for another organization (SI-LI-01).  
 
In addition, at the time of research38, FONCODES was facing the possibility of 
being phased-out, as it has been discussed elsewhere. No new funds had been committed 
for a follow-up stage to the program. Moreover, the political signature of the 
organization has been a burden and post-Fujimori administrations have not fully 
committed to keep the organization running39. By the time the researcher was in Lima, 
the government was evaluating the possibility of closing down the program in the 
following months, without waiting until its formal completion date in September 2008. 
The tensions that the possible extinction of the institution generated were evident. When 
asked about staff’s motivation towards their jobs, one of the managers answered, “I 
                                                 
38
 The research was carried out in October 2007. 
39
 For a discussion on this see Chapter 4 of this study.  
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think that nobody is motivated under these circumstances. I keep going to my 
colleagues’ offices to find out the latest news… we are in a very difficult moment for the 
organization” (SI-LI-04). Another manager commented: “We cannot talk about 
motivation today. Maybe six or twelve months ago, it was different…” (SI-LI-02) 
In this line, those who answered that the staff was not motivated were, in general, 
making reference to the particular circumstances the organization was going through as 
the cause for this lack of motivation. They made clear that they thought people had been 
motivated before.  
When analyzing the responses of the external agents separately, they showed 
different factors of motivation. They were asked what motivated them to do their jobs 
and their answers were varied. Thus, they mentioned that: a) they needed the job 
because they have to support their families, b) they liked their job because it allows them 
to use what they have learned, or move forward, in their careers, b) they liked the job 
because they can travel to different communities of Peru and meet different people. Of 
the six interviewed agents, only two mentioned that they obtained some satisfaction 
from helping ‘the poor’. One of them said that he had a great affection for FONCODES 
and the work they had done (SI-EA-06).  
 
Overall FONCODES does not have a clear system to provide incentives for 
agents to attend to communities other than the conditions of the contract. As a 
consequence some of these agents might seek mechanisms to cope with this lack of 
incentives and benefits by not fulfilling the required activities, i.e. by ‘underperforming’.  
 There seems to be a difference on the factors that foster or hinder motivation 
between managers and external agents. Thus, management at central offices claimed to 
be motivated by altruistic goals. Job stability is also a great factor of influence on 
motivation, especially with regards to the particular situation FONCODES is 
undergoing. External agents seem to obtain their motivation from more ‘material’ goals 
such as career and job security.  
 
Staff’s Influence on Community Participation 
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The previous indicators attempted to analyze how the tasks of the personnel and 
field staff were influenced by several factors such as qualification, training, incentives 
and motivation. In addition, this research proposed to evaluate whether the personnel 
working at community level might actually have an influence on participatory processes. 
This is indeed difficult to assess without an in-depth immersion in the Social Fund’s 
projects dynamics. Based on the empirical work carried out for this research, it is not 
possible to have strong evidence on this issue that would allow making more general 
conclusions40. However, some evidence obtained from the interviews with FONCODES’ 
personnel and experts can hint at some issues of importance within this matter.   
As it was already evidenced in previous sections, FONCODES’ personnel seem 
to think that field staff may influence community participation in some ways. It is worth 
noting that there are two forms by which field staff could influence the project at 
community level: a) by fostering or hindering community participation and b) by 
influencing project aspects directly (priority setting, project design, etc). On the former, 
it seems that lack of communication with community members tends to affect 
participation and community contributions. This may hinder possibilities of more 
accurate preference targeting in cases where the priority of the community has not been 
correctly identified. Overall, these factors may have consequences for project 
sustainability. One of the managers commented that the attendance to meetings by 
community members is related to the “level of understanding [the agent] has with the 
community authorities”. He noted,  
We need to have a strategy to reach the community. If we just extend a 
formal invitation, we might not have a successful meeting. If we first try to 
reach the community authorities, get to know the community, learn what 
their needs are and raise awareness about the project, they will attach more 
importance to it. Then people will attend the meetings (SI-AB-03). 
 
Findings from previous sections point out at an indirect influence of the project 
facilitators and field staff. They may indirectly provide a positive or a negative incentive 
for participation of community members, depending on several factors, such as personal 
traits, background, training and motivation to implement participatory process. This 
                                                 
40
 Given the logistic limitations faced in this research (see section 3.3.2), further, more in-depth study 
would be necessary to better understand these linkages.  
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should be further assessed at the community level and by following up and controlling 
specific projects in order to have more conclusive evidence.  
On the other hand, the claim is made that project facilitators influence the 
articulation of demands and priority setting in the community (Mosse, 2001). This study 
found no strong evidence regarding this possible situation. The main reason for this is 
that projects are now being prioritized at the local government level, within the Local 
Development Plans (LDP). The consequences of this will be assessed in the next section.  
However, it is important to note that some of the interviewees mentioned that 
during FONCODES initial years, it was common that the agents influenced the selection 
of the project and its execution more directly. However, it was argued that a learning 
process from both, communities and field staff, has contributed to make the projects 
more participatory. One of the managers commented,  
When FONCODES started, there was little knowledge of this participatory 
model within the government agencies and in the communities. There was 
little input from the communities… the project proposed by the [external 
agent] was generally executed without any objections. That has changed and 
now the local people participate in a more representative way. They have 
learned that they can participate and make decisions. And the staff has also 
learned [to let them do it] (SI-LI-02).  
 
In the same line, an assessment of FONCODES conducted by Rawlings et al. 
(2004: 146) found that 6% of the surveyed community members identified the 
Proyectista as the person who had determined which project was selected. However, 
when asked whether the Proyectista had first suggested the project, one-third answered 
positively, while a third said no and the rest did not know. Rawlings et al. conclude that 
“even where the [agents] may have provided an important impetus by informing the 
community of the program, in a majority of the cases community members did not 
perceive them as having determined project selection” (2004: 147). This evidence 
suggests that facilitators can indeed have an influence on project issues that are ought to 
be decided by the community.  
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5.1.3. Institutional Environment 
Local Governments  
The decentralization process initiated in 2001 gave local governments41 a whole 
new range of competencies. Among these, local governments (LGs) are now required to 
execute participatory Local Development Plans (LDPs) and Participatory Budgeting 
(PB). LDPs and PBs are carried out through a process where civil society can articulate 
and prioritize their demands at the local level. LGs rank those demands according to a 
established priority criteria.  
For FONCODES, the changes brought about by the decentralization process 
have translated into a closer coordination with Province and District Municipalities. The 
priorities of the communities are now articulated through LDPs. FONCODES 
coordinates the targeting and execution of the project with the municipality (which in 
many cases co-finances the projects), according to the priority established by the LDP. 
Municipalities can choose to either use FONCODES’ project model (where the project 
is executed directly by the community) or to manage the projects themselves (Direct 
Administration). FONCODES is involved in both cases, acting as a ‘technical 
consultant’ for those projects that are implemented directly by the municipalities. This 
research has focused only on projects that are managed by the community. Thus, this 
indicator aims to assess the implications of the participation of LGs within 
FONCODES’ projects as well as the LG’s influence at community level. The findings 
for this indicator are mainly based on interviews with experts and, to a lesser degree, on 
interviews with managers, agents and community members.  
The interviewed managers mentioned some positive outcomes from the inclusion 
of LGs at project targeting and implementation. The process is now more ‘democratic’ 
and LGs do not feel as if they are being by-passed by the national government anymore. 
FONCODES had long been seen as a tool from the national government to intervene 
directly in the community, and the inclusion of LGs has helped legitimize its image vis-
à-vis lower levels of government. In turn, this has helped FONCODES to obtain the 
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 The term Local Government will be used indistinctly to refer to the two lower levels of the Peruvian government 
structure, the Province and District Municipalities.  
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commitment of the municipality for the maintenance of the infrastructure after project 
completion. One of the managers noted, 
One of the positive consequences [of including the LGs in the process] is 
that we are not ‘by-passing’ them anymore. Before, when we transferred the 
completed works, they did not feel responsible for them. [With the new 
model], they have to commit resources for maintenance even before the 
project is executed (SI-LI-06).  
 
Another manager commented that the LDPs have allowed a comprehensive 
understanding of communities’ needs and priorities at a district level, rather than the 
isolated community. With the previous model “we went to one community without 
knowing what happened in the community next to it” (SI-LI-02).  
However, some of the problems identified by the managers were related to the 
local government’s willingness (or lack thereof) to use the FONCODES project model. 
Several managers mentioned that the LGs refuse having the projects implemented by a 
community’s Representatives Committee because they are afraid of the political 
consequences this might carry for them. LGs may see the RC as a political instance that 
contests the power of the District Municipality. One manager reported, 
Some of the municipalities see the RCs as possible political opponents, 
because there have been cases of RC members that have later become 
elected officials to the local government. Then, there has always been a tacit 
fear from some Mayors […] that FONCODES is creating a ‘leadership 
school’ and that those leaders will be running for elected positions  (SI-LI-
07).  
 
Finally, the majority of the interviewees referred to a negative influence that the 
articulation of communities’ priorities through LDPs might have on FONCODES’ 
projects. They mentioned that, in practice, LDPs might not reflect the needs or priorities 
of the local populations. The reasons for this are varied, and, according to the managers, 
closely related to the LGs form of operation. Thus, LGs may affect priority setting by a 
poorly performed LDP process (e.g. a process that it is not participatory) or by altering 
those priorities when the projects are executed (i.e. deliberately changing the priority). 
One manger noted that “sometimes the Mayor prioritizes the project at the municipal 
level but it has not been a demand introduced by the beneficiaries; when [FONCODES’] 
 
 
 
 
 84
Evaluador gets to the community, he finds out that the project was not a need articulated 
by the community” (SI-LI-02). Another manager expressed that  
Sometimes the municipality does not carry out its LDP correctly, for 
example by not fulfilling the procedures or attendance minimum that are 
required […] sometimes even the Mayor can choose the priorities based on 
how many voters a community has (SI-LI-06).  
 
This comment reflects a possible political manipulation of project targeting for 
the benefit of the LG. One of the managers said that “[LGs] are not interested in projects 
that have a low number of beneficiaries” (SI-LI-06). 
It is important to note that the majority of the managers mentioned that they have 
a good working relationship with many municipalities. Many municipalities have 
utilized FONCODES’ execution model and are strong proponents of it.  
One caveat is that this indicator did not obtain the views of the beneficiaries or 
LG officials. However, the findings are relevant to show the perception of the managers 
on how one component of FONCODES’ institutional context might affect its model. 
 
Local Indigenous Institutions 
Peruvian social organization has strong roots in traditional community structures. 
This is particularly important at the indigenous communities located in the Andes 
Mountains. FONCODES prides itself in having built up its implementing model 
following-up on existing and long-standing traditions of community organization. Thus, 
both FONCODES’ project cycle and model would be based on these ancient traditions. 
Although, due to the mentioned research limitations, this research did not collect enough 
evidence to assess the role this traditional organization plays in community participation 
in Social Fund projects, some interviews with experts on this topic will be briefly 
referred here (UI-01 and UI-02). 
There is a long-standing tradition of participation in the Andean culture that is 
based in strong concepts of group and community. This tradition is substantiated in 
determined organizational structures such as the community ‘assembly’ (meeting) and 
the community ‘directorate’ (authorities).  The community assembly is the instance at 
which decisions are made. This assembly periodically elects the community authorities. 
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All the matters of importance to the community are discussed and decided at this 
‘assembly’. On the other hand, the community ‘directorate’ is legally recognized within 
the formal structure of the Peruvian State. The directorate has legal capacity to act and 
keeps a registry of the decisions made at the meetings.  
The Representatives Committee (RC) for FONCODES’ projects is chosen at the 
‘community assembly’. The RC is thus legitimated at this meeting within the local 
organization. According to one of the experts interviewed, this means that the RC is held 
accountable by the community and will have to use the established mechanisms for the 
participation to be considered legitimate (UI-02). One of the possible consequences of 
these institutional arrangements within the community is that sometimes the RC 
becomes a parallel instance of power and might distort the community organization. It 
was argued that this could happen because the RC administers project funds, which 
gives it more power vis-à-vis the community’s authorities. The role of this local 
indigenous institution will be further analyzed in section 5.2.  
 
5.2. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS 
This variable aims to assess the level of participation of the community in Social 
Fund projects’ priority setting, design and implementation, according to the 
opportunities to participate at those stages. As noted in the previous analysis, the Social 
Fund project cycle and other design elements are indeed geared towards the inclusion of 
the communities. However, it has also been found that several characteristics of the 
Social Fund and its environment influence the way in which people participate in the 
projects. Community participation in Social Fund projects will be assessed at two 
different levels, namely, formal and substantive inclusion. The findings in this section 
are based on programme documents, secondary data from FONCODES evaluations and 
interviews with experts, community members and FONCODES staff.  
 
5.2.1 Formal Inclusion: Designing Spaces for Participation 
Formal inclusion will be analyzed here by assessing the instances at which 
communities are ‘allowed’ to enter Social Fund projects. At FONCODES, these 
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instances can be observed throughout the project cycle phases. Key instances are the 
Community’s Representatives Committee (RC), Community Meetings, Training 
Workshops and Community Contributions. The opportunities to participate at project 
stages is summarized in Table 5.2, according to the indicators proposed by the research.  
 
Community Representatives Committee42 
FONCODES’ model considers the community as the project implementing 
‘agency’. This implementing group is represented by a Committee of four people elected 
by the community at a general meeting. A President, a Secretary, a Treasurer and an 
Overseer form the Representatives Committee. In recent years, the position of Overseer 
is filled with a municipal employee designated by the local government, which now 
many times co-finance the project. Furthermore, it is recommended that one of the 
members of the RC be a woman.  
The RC is responsible for executing the project and administering the funds. 
They do so with the guidance of two external agents, the Resident Expert and the Project 
Supervisor. Among other functions, the RC has to hire the workers for construction, 
provide information to FONCODES agents, and pay their salaries. The RC has the 
responsibility of providing information to the community on the project’s 
implementation and funds administration at monthly meetings.  
 
Community Meetings43 
Community meetings must be held throughout the entire project cycle. They 
have to be representative (more than 51% of families in the community have to attend), 
and the participation of women is encouraged. During the initial phases of the project, 
the meetings are the main instance where community members get information on 
project requirements and design. Here, they express their preferences and make the 
commitment for their contribution and participation towards the project. During project 
execution, the community meetings have to be organized by the RC to inform about 
project implementation activities and decisions.  
                                                 
42
 The information on this section has been collected from FONCODES Operational Guidelines, 2006. 
43
 This information has been collected from FONCODES Operational Guidelines, 2006 
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Table 5.2 Formal Inclusion: Opportunities to participate (Source: Author) 
 PROJECT PHASE 
OPPORTUNITIES 
TO PARTICIPATE Priority Setting
44
 Project Design Project Implementation 
Access to 
Information 
This instance has been 
relocated under local 
government control, 
through Local 
Development Plans. 
This research did not 
find evidence on how 
the community access 
information about 
opportunities to define 
its priorities. 
The Proyectista and 
Evaluador inform the 
community about the 
design of the project 
The Community RC and 
the Resident Expert have 
to inform the community 
on the progress in the 
implementation of the 
project at monthly 
meetings. 
Express opinions 
Community members 
should be able to 
express their 
preferences for 
development projects in 
Local Development 
Plans. 
The Proyectista and the 
Evaluador have to ask 
community members 
(especially the RC) on 
issues that influence 
project design. 
The project cycle design 
does not address this 
issue. Evidence was found 
that community members 
can express suggestions 
and opinions during the 
implementation of the 
project at community 
meetings. 
Take part in 
decision-making 
Community members 
should be able to 
influence the election 
of the development 
project through LDP. 
Evidence was found 
that this might be 
hindered. 
The project cycle design 
does not address this 
issue. No specific 
evidence was found on 
any direct influence that 
the community might 
have on project design 
The community RC and 
Resident Expert share 
responsibility for all the 
decisions about project 
implementation. 
Take part in 
management 
instances 
Community members 
should be able to 
decide their 
development priority 
through LDPs. 
Evidence was found 
that this process might 
be hindered. 
Community members do 
not design the projects 
themselves. No evidence 
was found that 
suggested otherwise. 
Communities implement 
the projects themselves, 
through a RC. The 
responsibility is shared 
with the Resident Expert. 
 
Training Workshops 
Every FONCODES project includes a training component for the RC and the 
community. According to program documents, this training has the objective of 
                                                 
44
 For approximately three years now, Priority Setting has been taken up by the local government through the 
implementation of Local Development Plans and Participatory Budgeting. It was out of the scope of this research to 
assess this process, which is now ‘outside’ FONCODES. However, evidence on the influence of Local Governments 
can be found in Section 5.1.3. of this study.  
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“building up capacity in the community and its leaders to strengthen community 
management processes” (IDB, 2002: 24). There are two types of training:  
a) Technical training, which is offered according to the type of project and 
focuses on construction, utilization and maintenance of works and on their management, 
administration and sustainability. The Resident Expert or the Supervisor normally give 
this training to the members of the RC.  
b) ‘Social’ training that is “crosscutting, [and focuses] on community 
participation, gender equity, the environment and community organization” (IDB, 2002: 
24). This training is offered to the entire community and is implemented by the 
Capacitador Social (Social Trainer). The community has to make an initial commitment 
to attend these training workshops, since it is one of the requirements for project 
financing.  
 
Community Contributions 
Every project requires a commitment by the community to contribute at least 
10% of the project’s unskilled labour. Water and sanitation projects require 50% 
minimum contribution45. These contributions are included in the project’s budget as part 
of the total cost.  
 
5.2.2. Substantive Inclusion: Assessing the Evidence 
This category of analysis aims to assess the substantive participation of 
community members at the formal participation instances detailed above. One caveat 
regarding this evidence is that the sample of interviewed community members was 
greatly limited by logistic problems during field research46. Therefore, the issues raised 
here need more extensive examination at the community level. The stated findings are 
based on observation, comments from community members and experts, as well as other 
empirical studies. 
                                                 
45
 This requirement was recently decreased from the 100% unskilled labor contribution the projects used to require.  
46 A more extensive description of the research limitations and its consequences for these findings can be found in 
section 3.3.2.  
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In their research, Rawlings et al. (2004) found that, in a study conducted between 
2000 and 2002, around 62% percent of community members surveyed confirmed that 
they had participated in the assembly to select the project and 59% of those had spoken 
at least once at the meeting. The study also finds that local governments played a role 
“in identifying community needs and drafting project proposals”, as 7% of those 
surveyed said that the LG had selected the project. This evidence does not include data 
from recent years, when the role of LG has become more relevant in project 
identification and priority setting. The study does not comment on any evidence of 
community participation during project design in Peru, but it states that participation at 
this stage fell dramatically for the programs covered by the study. Lastly, the study finds 
that 83% of those surveyed said the community had participated in project 
implementation. Of those, about 67% said that they had participated directly, most 
commonly by providing labour (90%). The evidence collected by the present research 
will be detailed below.  
 
Community Representatives Committee 
The majority of interviewees at community level were part of the RC. They confirmed 
that the community elects the RC members at the community meeting. In communities that 
had executed more than a project with FONCODES funding, the RC members change with 
every project, which allows more people to take the responsibility for the project and the funds 
(SI-CO-04).   
However, it was observed that in some cases the RC members had been chosen at an 
external non-representative instance. Thus, a woman who was a member of the RC for a 
school improvement project commented that the school principal had selected her because 
the person that was initially elected had declined the position (SI-CO-02).  
Furthermore, in spite of what is required by operational documents, it was noticed that 
some RCs did not include women among its members. When prompted about that fact, one 
interviewee commented, “we should have a woman [in the RC] but no woman wanted to 
accept the position” (SI-CO-01). Some informal talks hinted that one of the reasons for a low 
degree of women participation at the RC is that they usually have lower levels of schooling. In 
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Peruvian indigenous communities, a lack of schooling correlates with not being able to speak 
Spanish. Thus, women might feel they will not be able to fulfil the responsibilities of a 
position within the RC because they are not able to read or write the documents or speak the 
language.   
FONCODES staff was asked if they thought that community members who are not 
part of the RC participated during project implementation, to which a majority answered 
positively. They said that in general people participate at community meetings, training 
sessions and by contributing to the project. However, one of the managers said that they do not 
participate actively or the degree of their participation is not relevant. According to him, some 
of the reasons for this were that people might not have been interested in the project or that the 
project prioritization was not adequate (SI-AB-01).  
 
Community Meetings 
Community members confirmed that they participated at community meetings. 
They usually receive the first information about the project at these meetings. During 
implementation, they can get updates on project activities and budget administration at 
the monthly meetings. When asked about the opportunities to express opinions at these 
meetings, one woman commented: “We have meetings every week and we all 
participate at them... We [the women] also have the right to attend the meetings and to 
give our opinions” (UI-07). In general, community members stated that they could 
express opinions at community meetings. However, the language barrier for the 
participation of women seemed to be a constant in the visited projects. One woman said, 
Women participate and talk [at meetings]… but not all of them, because the 
[school] Principal and the [Resident Expert] speak Spanish and the majority 
of [the women] do not understand or speak Spanish. And men speak Spanish 
more often. Sometimes, as a woman, I have to translate for the women and 
explain to them [what it is being said at the meeting] (SI-CO-02).  
 
Additionally, when they were asked if they talked to FONCODES’ external 
agents, some women answered negatively. They commented that they express their 
opinions to the men in the community (mainly to their husbands), who then express 
them before the agents (UI-07). This comment suggests that this is a mechanism utilized 
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by women to mobilize their opinions without breaking some of the rules assigned to 
their traditional roles.   
FONCODES personnel were also asked about these issues. Their perceptions 
were that men tend to participate more at community meetings. In some communities, 
women stay on the side and do not express opinions. The language is in many cases the 
main barrier for them to express opinions.  
 
Training Workshops 
Some evidence collected on the ‘Social Training’ aspect shows that the majority of the 
interviewees at community level gave great importance to the training workshops as a space of 
participation. These instances were also utilized as a space to get information about the 
project. It is interesting to note that, of the interviewees, women tend to mention the training 
workshop as an instance for participation more often than men. This correlates with the 
perception of FONCODES’ staff that the attendants to these workshops are mostly women. 
The reasons for this seem to be twofold. First, men are the ones who spend the day outside the 
community working on the farms, being the women who are ‘available’ for these workshops. 
Second, as one of the Social Trainers mentioned, women seem to be more interested in the 
topics offered at these trainings (SI-EA-04).  
In addition, it seems that participation at this instance might be highly affected by 
‘seasonality’. Thus, participation tends to vary according to the day of the week the meeting is 
held as well as with the agricultural season.   
 
Community Contributions 
FONCODES’ sub-projects usually require a community contribution, which is 
generally fulfilled through labour. In order to meet their commitment, communities 
usually organize days of collective work, called faenas (‘work-day’). The faenas require 
that all the families in the community contribute towards the project with labour and 
other support tasks. Since most of the sub-projects are for small scale infrastructure 
(schools, health posts, water taps, latrines, feeder roads), it is customary that men 
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provide heavy labour while most women participate in a support role, i.e. by cooking, 
fetching water, taking care of the children.  
The community is usually ‘summoned’ to the faena either by the traditional 
authorities or the RC. The role of the community authorities seems to be stronger at this 
instance, which suggests that participation at faenas might need their legitimization. 
Some interviewees mentioned that they organize community meetings after the 
faenas since more people can attend the meetings then. Thus, this instance seems to 
work as a space for community gathering where information or decisions on the project 
can be made. They also represent an opportunity for communal sharing of food and 
work, and are seen as an extension of the community’s traditions.  
One of the questions explored referred to the willingness (or actual attendance) 
of community members towards this type of contributions. Community members 
expressed that generally a majority of the people attended the faenas. When asked if 
local people complained about this requirement, the majority of the interviewees 
answered negatively. Some said that people understood the project was beneficial for the 
community and thus, they had to contribute to it. One of the interviewed community 
members commented, 
We are always ready to contribute when it comes to the betterment of the 
community. It is the way in which we are organized. We have to fulfil our 
commitment to the community. It is a right that we have for being part of the 
community… and a tradition that comes from our grandparents (SI-CO-04) 
 
This comment reveals how the local tradition of participation in the indigenous 
communities of Peru is still strong and serves the purpose of FONCODES model.  
Nevertheless, the perception of the community members contrasted with that of 
the interviewed staff. A majority of the personnel thought that community members 
would tend to complain about having to make contributions. According to them, this 
depended on many factors.  First, it seemed to be related to the type of the project and 
the interest the community has on it. An example of this is found in electrification 
projects, which, according to one of the agents, are of great importance for communities 
and therefore they tend to participate more in them (SI-EA-01). Another important factor 
was the fact that community members do not want to sacrifice present income in order to 
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contribute to the project. One of the managers commented that when the requirements 
for community contributions are too high, the locals privilege other activities that have a 
more direct benefit to them (SI-LI-02). In the same line, ‘seasonality’ is again an 
important factor on community contributions, according to the managers. “If they are 
busy with their agricultural tasks, there is a greater tendency to fail in fulfilling their 
commitments [towards the project]” (SI-LI-08). More research would be necessary to 
find out how the issue of ownership affects the contributions by the community. 
 
5.2.3 A Note on Community Participation’s Impact 
The issue of preference targeting was explored in this research and evidence is 
available from primary and secondary data. On the latter, Rawlings et al. (2004: 144) 
find that 90% of the respondents (and 92% of women) said that the project selected was 
the highest-priority investment. The evidence from primary data shows that a great 
majority of the interviewed community members considered the project as the 
investment they needed the most. Only one interviewee said that she would have liked to 
have other project, but she said that the community was satisfied with the project 
selected (SI-CO-02). Due to the size of the sample, the evidence is insufficient to make 
conclusions, but combined with the data obtained from Rawlings et al., it can be argued 
that the preference targeting of the investments tends to be high. 
Some of FONCODES’ personnel also thought that community participation 
increases the commitment towards the project, which has an influence on project 
sustainability. One of the managers said, 
The more the community participates, the higher it is their commitment 
[towards the project]. This has an influence not only on community 
contributions but also in the project sustainability. I see projects sometimes 
that are very well maintained and the reason for that is that [the local people] 
feel it as their own project and maintain it (SI-LI-07). 
  
A different issue raised by the managers was that participation increased 
managerial capacities at community level. The community members also hinted that 
there had been some effects on this sense. One caveat is that this effect might be 
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circumscribed to individuals who have been part of the RC. One of the RC’ members 
that were interviewed stated, 
As part of the RC we have had a nice experience. A Trainer has come and 
taught us how to manage and maintain all these works. It has been very 
useful for us because, when other projects are brought to the community, we 
can make suggestions. And although we are not going to be [in the RC], 
there will be other people and we will be on their side, helping them (SI-CO-
04) 
 
Overall, a study from a FONCODES’ impact evaluation found that “community 
participation has the effect of increasing the probabilities of project success […] 
although the size of the effect depends on community and project characteristics.” 
(Alcazar and Wachtenheim, 2002: 30). However, this research did not verify these 
effects at community level and more in-depth research would be necessary to assess this 
issue. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Within the Social Funds model, community participation is expected to 
contribute to project success by eliciting development priorities directly from the 
beneficiaries and by giving them a certain degree of control over project management 
and resources. However, current critiques to participation approaches have argued that 
participatory processes might be ‘manipulated’ by external agencies that are constrained 
by their own organizational needs and procedures as well as by their institutional 
environment. This research has aimed to empirically assess these postulates by 
analyzing the influence of the Social Funds’ organizational context and institutional 
environment on community participation processes.  
Some authors have suggested that certain characteristics have to be present in the 
organization as well as in project facilitators for the participatory processes to have more 
chances of success. This research has sought to explore which specific elements within 
the organization’s system may have an effect on community participation, bearing in 
mind the differences between formal and substantive inclusion of individuals in 
participatory processes. For the empirical study carried out at FONCODES, a qualitative 
approach has been privileged, seeking to obtain the different actors’ perceptions on these 
contested matters. The choice of a case study research approach has generated a great 
amount of complex data, which is difficult to summarize within a few general lines. 
However, some conclusions can be obtained that have been hinted by the evidence 
described in this study. 
 
6.1. ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE  
The general findings of the research can be grouped following the lines proposed 
by this study.  The overall evidence shows that the organizational context and 
institutional environment influence community participation in FONCODES projects. 
The direction of this influence depends on how particular areas of the organizational 
context are structured as well as on political variables in the institutional environment.  
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In general, the organizational systems and procedures as structured at 
FONCODES seem to be geared towards formal inclusion of communities in projects. 
The project cycle is designed in a way that offers many instances for communities to 
participate, such as community meetings, representative committees and community 
contributions. Overall, FONCODES structure is decentralized and the procedures are 
fairly flexible. This translates into communities being able to introduce claims and 
suggestions at different levels of the Social Fund. It also makes it possible to adapt some 
of the procedures to specific characteristics of the communities and/or the projects. This 
evidence is consistent with the theoretical argument that proposes that participatory 
methodologies can be more easily adopted in organizations with more flexible structure 
and hierarchy styles. 
The evidence from the analysis on the role of personnel and field staff shows that 
FONCODES staff’s influence on community participation can be negative when they 
are not qualified, trained or motivated to facilitate participatory processes, as well as 
when the organization does not offer incentives for these personnel. This influence 
might indirectly hinder substantive inclusion of communities within project process by 
affecting the communication between the facilitator and the community members. The 
consequences of this problem can have an effect in the willingness of the community to 
participate, contribute and maintain the project. It can also translate into projects that do 
not address the real need or priority of the community. However, no strong evidence was 
found that project facilitators directly influence the shaping of needs or demands by the 
community (priority setting), since the local government is now responsible for 
collecting that information from communities and prioritizing the projects at the district 
level. Some evidence was found that suggests a greater direct influence by facilitators on 
project decisions during FONCODES’ initial years. This might have happened due to a 
lack of knowledge about the process on the community and the facilitators’ side. This 
evidence is insufficient to assess if project facilitators ‘shape the needs’ of the 
community as proposed by one of the critiques to participation.  
The findings on the influence of the Social Fund’s Institutional Context show 
that the Local Government has indeed an influential role on the application of 
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participatory processes as well as in priority setting for FONCODES’ projects.  Fear of 
contestant power from community leaders might hinder political will to implement 
projects that are managed by local populations. Moreover, priority setting and ranking 
might be skewed towards projects that bring political benefits. These effects largely 
depend on the particular characteristics of the specific municipality. On the other hand, 
the analysis of local indigenous institutions shows that these instances can be 
successfully used to legitimize the Social Fund’s interventions and, especially, to obtain 
the commitment of the community for contributions to the project. Following the 
theoretical postulate proposed in this study, it can be argued that the need to interact 
with some actors within its institutional context can be a factor that influences 
FONCODES’ implementation of participatory processes. However, these actors can 
foster or hinder participation depending on their specific organizational and political 
context.   
Finally, some evidence was found on formal and substantive opportunities to 
participate at different project stages. Overall, FONCODES does well at designing 
formal instances of participation at promotion and project implementation stages. Project 
design seems to have little input from communities. This seems to be a general 
characteristic of Social Funds, and, as noted, it could hinder the design of projects that 
might overlook specific traits of the community and the problem itself. This could 
ultimately affect project sustainability. However, further assessment of this issue is 
necessary. On the other hand, there are few design characteristics in FONCODES 
project cycle and procedures aimed at ensuring a substantive inclusion of women and 
non-Spanish speaking people in the community. Due to the limitations encountered by 
this research, this issue needs further examination at community level in order to have 
more conclusive evidence.  
It is important to stress that there are reasons to believe that this analysis cannot 
be extended beyond FONCODES to the study of Social Funds in general. Although 
Social Funds share some basic principles and characteristics, their organization and 
structure vary from country to country. Furthermore, FONCODES has some particular 
characteristics, especially with regards to the use of local traditional models of 
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organization as well as to the extent of control that grants to community committees, 
which make difficult to derive generalizations from its study. Therefore, the findings can 
serve as guidance for other Social Funds and to unveil the complex reality of Social 
Fund design47.  
 
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The evidence obtained suggests that certain elements within the organizational 
and procedures design of FONCODES can be improved in order to minimize (or revert) 
their negative impact on community participation. The case study presented here may 
indeed provide some lessons for organizational design of Social Funds, especially on the 
issue of Social Funds personnel and field staff as well as for some project cycle issues:  
• Training in social management and participation topics should be 
encouraged and prioritized by the organization. This type of training is even 
more relevant for organizations that require a high level of technical personnel. It 
could provide instances for the facilitators to reflect on their influence on the 
process.  
• The role of the external agents should be clearly defined within the 
hierarchy structure. This would provide more means of control on the 
performance and fulfilment of their commitments towards participatory 
processes. Additionally, by receiving clear information on this matter, 
communities should be more aware of the demands they can place on the 
external agents.  
• Some incentives geared towards generating a greater involvement of the 
field staff with the communities should be provided by the organization.  
 
This study has dealt with complex interrelated issues that have consequences for 
community participation as well as for project outcomes. The scope for further research 
is great. The influence of personnel and field staff on community participation processes 
needs to be further assessed. An analysis of the dynamics at community level could help 
                                                 
47
 See section 4.2 of this study. 
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to identify this in greater depth. Furthermore, the role the organization might play on 
substantive inclusion of community members within participatory processes should be 
further analyzed. Finally, the effects of reduced levels of participation during project 
design projects in Social Funds should be further evaluated in order to identify 
alternatives that allow a greater inclusion of the community at this stage.  
In general, it can be argued that the critique of participation has opened a wide 
range for future research. Its value does not lie in discrediting the participatory approach, 
but rather in the identification of principles, strategies and procedures that can help to 
improve its implementation.  
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ANNEX I: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
A. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MANAGERS AT FONCODES’ CENTRAL AND REGIONAL 
OFFICES 
 
1. Personal information 
1.1. Time working for the organization: 
1.2. Position/s: 
1.3. Educational Background: 
 
2. Organizational Procedures 
2.1. Training  
2.1.1. Has the staff of FONCODES received training in participatory 
methodologies/participation (in general)? 
If yes:  
2.1.1.1. To whom has this training been addressed to? 
2.1.1.2. What contents have been included in the training? 
2.1.1.3. How often has it been offered? 
2.1.1.4. In your opinion, how does the training in participation contribute towards 
accomplishing the tasks performed by the staff? 
2.1.1.5 Do you think that influences the projects at the community level? 
2.1.1.6. Do you think it would be necessary to change something in the current 
training system? What? 
If not:  
2.1.1.7. Do you consider this training would be necessary for the staff? 
If yes:  
2.1.1.7.1. In your opinion, in which way would that training contribute to 
the tasks of the staff in relation to the projects? 
2.1.1.7.2 Among the staff, who would be more benefited by this type of 
training? 
If not: 2.1.1.7.3. Why not? 
2.2 Field Level Staff 
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2.2.1. What type of educational background or skills do you consider are necessary in 
the staff that works directly with communities? (Group into technical or social) 
2.2.2. Do you consider these background or skills have an effect in the projects? Which 
one? 
2.2.3. In your opinion, which skills/background are more important? 
2.2.4. Do you consider that there is enough staff in the field with these 
skills/background? 
2.3 Flexibility 
2.3.1 Are there common procedures that every project must follow, according to pre-
established rules? 
If yes: 
2.3.1.1. How have these procedures been established? 
2.3.1.2. Can these procedures be changed if the situation (in the community or 
the project itself) requires it? 
2.3.1.3. Do you think this system has an effect in the participation of the 
community? Which one? 
2.3.1.4. Do you think this system has an effect on the projects’ outcomes? Which 
one? 
If not:  
2.3.1.5. How do you think this affects the work of the staff with the 
communities? 
 
3. Incentives and Motivation 
3.1. In your opinion, is the staff sufficiently motivated to apply participatory processes 
in sub-projects? 
 -If yes:  
3.1.1. What is in your opinion the main reason for the staff to be motivated? 
If not:  
3.1.2. Why do you think this happens? 
3.2. Does the staff in contact with communities receive financial/material benefits? 
(Travel/Mobility allowances, Bonuses, Other) 
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3.3. In your opinion, how do these incentives affect the job of field staff in contact with 
communities? (In general and regarding participatory processes) 
3.4 Do you think there is a relation/link between the participation of the community and 
the performance of the field staff? 
 
4. Institutional Context 
4.2. How do local governments influence the participatory processes in FONCODES' 
projects? (Especially in relation with the setting of priorities by communities)  
4.3. Do you consider that the decentralization of tasks and functions to FONCODES' 
regional and local offices is appropriate? Why? 
4.4. Do you think that the claims and suggestions the community makes can be 
channelled to the regional offices? And to the central office? Do they find solution? 
 
5. Socio-economic differences within the community 
5.1. Do you think that people outside the executing group (RC) have the ability to make 
suggestions and to be heard? (by the RC and by FONCODES' agents) 
5.2. Do you think that the (mainly) in-kind contributions the community is bounded to 
make affect the possibilities of certain individuals to participate? How? 
 
B. INTERVIEW GUIDE  FOR EXTERNAL AGENTS 
 
1. Personal information 
1.4. Time working for the organization: 
1.5. Position/s: 
1.6. Educational Background: 
 
2. Organizational Procedures 
2.1. Training  
2.1.1. Have you received training from FONCODES? 
 If yes: 2.1.1.1. What kind of training have you received? (participatory 
methodologies?) 
 2.1.1.2. How often?  
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 2.1.1.3. In which way do you feel this training has contributed to perform the 
tasks related to the project? 
 2.1.1.4. Do you think it is necessary to make any changes in the training system? 
 If not: 2.1.1.5. Would you like to receive training from FONCODES? What kind 
of training? Why? 
2.2 Field Level Staff 
2.2.1. Which of the following background/skills  do you consider are more relevant for 
the job of the agents in contact with communities?  
 - Social background/skills (i.e. social scientists, teachers, etc. name a few) 
 - Technical background/skills (i.e. engineers, architects, etc. name a few) 
2.2.2. Do you consider these background or skills have an effect in the projects? Which 
one? 
2.2.3. Do you consider that there is enough staff in the field with these 
skills/background? 
2.3. Flexibility 
2.3.1. How do FONCODES’ rules or procedures affect your tasks? 
2.3.2. Do you feel there is room for extraordinary situations to be considered within the 
projects? 
2.3.3. Do you think this system benefits or harm your work with the community? 
 
3. Incentives and Motivation 
3.1. Do you receive any material benefits when working with communities that are far 
away from the main towns? Which one? 
3.2. What other types of benefits or incentives do you receive from FONCODES? 
3.3 How does this affect your job? 
3.4. What would you change in the system? 
3.5 What is your motivation to do this job? 
 
4. Institutional Context 
4.1. Do you consider you have good channels to communicate with the regional office of 
FONCODES?  
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4.2. Do you think the communities have good communication channels with the regional 
office? 
4.3. Do you think that the regional office has ‘freedom of movement’ vis-à-vis the 
central office? 
 
5. Socio-economic differences in the community 
5.1. Do you think that the beneficiaries’ opinions and suggestions (outside the RC) can 
be taken into account? 
5.2. Does the in-kind contribution asked to the community affect their participation? 
How? 
5.3 What happens with those who cannot contribute?  
 
C. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
 
1. Personal information 
1.1. Gender: W/M 
1.2. Age: 
1.3. Activity: (What do you or your family do for a living?) 
1.4. Schooling:  
1.5. Have you been part of the Representatives Committee (RC)? 
 
2. Participation in Meetings and Decisions 
2.1. How did the community find out about the project? 
2.2. Have you been part of meetings concerning the project? 
2.3. Do you feel that your opinions or ideas were heard and taken into account? 
2.3.1. If not: Why not? 
2.4. How have the decisions about the project been made by the community? 
2.5. Do you think this is an appropriate system to make the decisions? Why? 
2.6. Did you have a system like this before the project? 
2.7. If asking a woman: Do you think women participate enough? Are their 
opinions taken into account?  
2.8. If asking a man: What do you think of the fact that women are part of the IG? 
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3. Participation in Implementation 
3.1. When the project was being executed, have you had information about 
progress in the works or the expenses?  
3.1.1. If yes: who gave you the information? 
3.1.2. If not: why haven’t you received such information? 
3.2. Have you contributed labour or money towards the project? 
3.3. Do you consider that is fine that you have to make this contribution?  
3.4. Are there people who cannot contribute? What does the community do in 
those cases? 
3.5. Do you feel you can find and talk to the Engineer and the Supervisor when 
you need them? 
3.6. And the people from FONCODES? 
3.7. Do you think the fact that the municipality was part of the project made a 
difference? Which one? 
3.8. Do you think the fact that the community was part of the project made a 
difference? Which one? 
 
4. Preference Targeting 
4.1. Do you think this project is what the community needed most at the time? 
4.1.1. If not: What other project would you have preferred?  
4.1.2. Why was not that project executed?  
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ANNEX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS 
 
A. LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
SI-AB-01- Regional Manager 1  
SI-AB-02- Regional Manager 2  
SI-AB-03- Regional Manager 3  
SI-AB-04- Regional Manager 4  
 
SI-CO-01 Community Member 1  
SI-CO-02 Community Member 2 
SI-CO-03 Community Member 3  
SI-CO-04 Community Member 4  
 
SI-EA-01- External Agent 1  
SI-EA-02- External Agent 2  
SI-EA-03- External Agent 3  
SI-EA-04- External Agent 4 
SI-EA-05- External Agent 5  
SI-EA-06- External Agent 6  
 
SI-LI-01- Coordination Manager 1  
SI-LI-02- Evaluation Manager 1  
SI-LI-03- Evaluation Manager 2 
SI-LI-04- Evaluation Manager 3  
SI-LI-05- Evaluation Manager 4  
SI-LI-06- Supervision Manager 1  
SI-LI-07- Supervision Manager 2  
SI-LI-08- Supervision Manager 2  
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SI-LI-09- Transference Manager  
SI-LI-10- Training Manager  
 
B. LIST OF UN-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
UI-01 Topic: Project Cycle 
UI-02 Topic: Local Governments 1  
UI-03 Topic: Local Government 2  
UI-04 Topic: Local Government 3  
UI-05 Topic: Program Impact 1  
UI-06 Topic: Program Impact 2 
UI-07 Community Members 
 
C. LIST OF CONSULTED OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS48  
 
OD-01 Operational Guidelines 2006  
OD-02 Operational Guidelines 2003 
OD-03 IDB-FONCODES- Loan Proposal 2002 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The following documents have been cited in the Bibliography. 
 
 
 
 
